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Abstract 
This dissertation contributes to the international literature by examining the relation 
between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and firm performance in China, 
especially under different types of ultimate shareholders, who have differing 
motivations and objectives regarding the structure of CEO compensation. I use 
unbalanced panel data from more than 1,300 Chinese A-share listed companies over 
2005-2009 and find that performance, especially one of market-based measurement, 
has a significant impact on CEO compensation. CEO compensation levels have risen 
in recent years due to economic gains rather than poor corporate governance. Firms 
that operate under other central government ministries (SOECG) than those of the 
ultimate shareholder do not use performance as a guideline for CEO pay, although 
they have the highest CEO compensation level amongst all five groups. The size of 
the board directors and independent directors are contributes positively to CEO 
compensation. While the degree of ownership concentration and size of supervision 
board are negative related to CEO compensation. Moreover, CEO gets higher pay if 
independent direct especially financial one working province is same as companies 
headquarter. Most of these results are consistent with my hypothesis. Shareholders, 
managers, government, and others who must make improvements in China’s 
corporate governance standards should find these results useful. In addition, the 
findings can offer future research directions.  
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I. Introduction 
Executive compensation has attracted wide attention from both theoretical and 
empirical researchers in the past two decades. Berle and Means (1932) first 
introduced the idea of chief executive officer (CEO) pay as a mechanism to align the 
interests of management with those of shareholders. A key issue of modern corporate 
governance is how to design compensation packages that give appropriate incentives 
to CEOs to maximise firm performance. To design an appropriate compensation 
package, the usual approach is to test the relationship between CEO compensation 
and firm performance, as well as other firm factors, such as characteristics of 
corporate governance and operations.  
 
Most past research is based on data from developed countries, such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom, while little research has focussed on developing 
countries. China, in particular, has gone through an enormous economic transition in 
the past two decades. It is necessary to investigate the unique ownership structure of 
China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to contribute to the international corporate 
governance literature. 
 
Because management serves as an agent for shareholders, the potential exists for 
management to put its own interests ahead of those of shareholders. Corporate 
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governance is designed to minimise such conflicts of interest. Effective corporate 
governance systems are designed to monitor management’s activities, reward good 
performance, and discipline managers who do not act in the best interests of 
shareholders. The modern era of executive compensation research began in the early 
1980s with the ascendancy of agency theory. Agency theory argues that there should 
be a positive relationship between CEO pay and firm performance. However, 
empirical results in the past two decades offer mixed conclusions. Many studies report 
weak or even negative relationships between pay and performance. Some critics argue 
that the CEO pay is related not only to firm performance but also to other factors. For 
example, if the board of directors is influenced by the CEO, the board does not 
structure the CEO compensation package to maximise shareholder value. 
Consequently, researchers have turned their attention to governance structure, 
industry, regulation, and so forth, trying to examine corporate governance in a more 
complex setting, but the results are still bewildering. 
 
Compensation systems and governance structures have evolved over several centuries 
in the United States and other industrialised countries. In comparison, the concept of 
corporate governance in China is relatively new and not well understood. The 
economic reform that began in China in 1978 has achieved impressive progress in last 
decades. Enterprise reform has been an important component, which has led to 
significant progress in developing a modern corporate governance system. The major 
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driver of continuing enterprise reform is the reform of SOEs, which seeks to 
strengthen the profit motive. Much of the policy content concerning the recent 
processes of change in China’s ownership system and enterprise reform is related to 
the guiding principles and the manner in which the corporate governance system is to 
be gradually structured and established. After 1998, numerous economic ministries 
were abolished that heretofore had been the link between industry and government, 
resulting in a reduction of ministerial interventions. As part of the process of 
economic reform in China, many SOEs were allowed by government to convert to 
shareholding companies. The establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 
December 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in April 1991 provide a place for 
firm to lists and for investors to invest.  
 
Thus, corporate restructuring has transformed former SOEs into profit-making entities 
listed on stock exchanges, and their executives have gained not only more power in 
decision-making processes but now must shoulder the primary responsibility to 
maximise shareholder wealth (Groves et al., 1994). As a result, monitoring 
management and incentivising top executives are issues of serious concern. Indeed, 
this incentive mechanism is a primary source of success for Chinese economic 
reforms, because it aligns the managers’ interests with those of shareholders and acts 
as an important device in solving agency problems (Firth et al., 2006). 
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China’s transformation from a central planned economy to a market economy, 
together with the 2002 introduction of a new code of corporate governance and 
accounting and auditing standards. This meant that SOEs are now operating under a 
newly established ‘modern enterprise system’. This shift provides an excellent 
laboratory in which to examine CEO pay levels and discover reasons why the pay–
performance relationship in China is effective. SOEs continue to play a main role in 
different industries in China. Hence, it is necessary to examine what determines 
managerial compensation in China’s listed firms and investigates whether this 
relationship is influenced by the unique ownership structure in listed firms. 
 
I propose to examine the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance using 
recently available data of listed firms in China. The special transition economics and 
unique SOE structure in China makes executive compensation in these firms unique, 
and thus this characteristic makes the research very interesting.  
 
In 1998, China’s listed firms were required to disclose the compensation of the top 
managers. Since 2005, however, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
has required all the listed company provide total compensation of every director, 
supervisor, and all members of senior management. This would imply that more 
detailed financial information for the upper echelons of listed companies’ 
compensation packages is required by both the government and shareholders. It 
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speaks to a need for more transparency of top management’s activities in setting 
compensation. 
 
The main objective of this research is to examine which factors determine the level of 
CEO compensation as well as the change of compensation under the framework of 
agency theory in Chinese-listed firms. This research attempts to address the following 
questions: Is there any significant relationship between CEO compensation and 
company performance in Chinese-listed firms, especially SOEs? Which measures, 
market-based or accounting-based, account for the greatest portion of CEO 
compensation? Does ultimate ownership affect CEO pay level? Does ownership 
structure, board composition, or other factors affect the pay–performance relationship? 
Does past performance affect the current CEO payment? Answering these questions is 
important to advance academic research and inform market investors, both of which 
can alleviate the agency problem to some extent. 
 
Contribution to knowledge and practice 
Firstly, my research adds to the compensation literature by using actual annual 
remuneration data for individual CEOs to investigate the relationship between CEO 
pay and performance in Chinese-listed SOEs. In China, the CEO’s received 
compensation is much higher than that of the other two top executives. The issue of 
aligning CEO work with shareholder goals combined with understanding the 
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appropriate incentives that will motivate managerial behaviour in CEOs has grown 
increasingly important ever since the separation of ownership and control in SOEs. 
Most prior research in corporate governance in China uses the average pay of the top 
three executives to proxy CEO pay (e.g., Buck, Liu, and Skovorod, 2008, Chen, Liu, 
and Li, 2010, Kato and Long, 2006). This situation relates to data availability and 
government regulations. Thus, the primary limitation of past research has been a lack 
of explanations that would reveal the complex relationships between CEO pay and 
performance in Chinese SOEs. It is my belief that my research will fill this gap by 
using newly unrestricted data to demonstrate the current pay–performance 
relationship in China.  
 
Secondly, China’s listed firms reveal unique ownership characteristics. One typical 
SOE has one dominant shareholder whose ownership is much higher than that of the 
next largest shareholder. The largest shareholder usually is empowered to affect firm 
control. Moreover, a number of listed companies are controlled not only by the largest 
shareholder but also administered by the central government, with both entities 
functioning as ultimate controllers. Government usually do not directly hold shares of 
the company but maintain control and voting rights. Thus, this research divides the 
type of ultimate ownership into five different groups: 1) central state asset 
management bureaus (SAMBs), 2) SOEs affiliated with the central government 
(SOECGs), 3) local state asset management bureaus (LAMBs), 4) SOEs affiliated 
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with local government (SOELGs) and 5) private and other forms (OTHERS). I will 
examine whether the type of ultimate ownership has an influence on CEO 
compensation. In addition, I will compare firms that are run by private investors with 
those in which SOEs are the largest shareholders to see which type of ownership is 
more efficient in dealing with the pay–performance relationship in China.  
 
Thirdly, the reform of SOEs has been a key issue since the beginning of China’s 
economic reform, with how to set a proper executive incentive plan being the major 
problem throughout the period. However, both a lack of incentive or over-incentives 
for top executives can cause companies to stay stuck in poor performance mode. 
Although some SOEs are keen to solve the incentive problem, because they lack 
meaningful theoretic guidelines, they rush to imitate the model of Western businesses 
and their compensation packages, with no clear conception of annual salary, stock 
options, and so forth. Further, without clearly stated package design theories and 
relevant implementation conditions, these hurried actions could cause a cascade of 
problems. Hence, investigating and establishing particular incentive and governance 
mechanisms for Chinese SOEs carries important implications for the future. I will 
research will analyse past lessons and make recommendations that will assist future 
policymaking. 
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II. Literature Review 
1. Agency Problem 
The modern corporation is characterised by a separation of ownership and 
management. This separation was first recognised as a possible problem by Berle and 
Means (1932). Shareholders (the principal) play a part as owners, but managers (the 
agent) maintain operating rights of the firm. 
 
Agency theory is described as a relationship in which both agents and principals seek 
to derive as much utility as possible with the least possible expenditure. In the 
framework of agency theory, a principal hires an agent to perform some service or 
task on the principal’s behalf (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is assumed that the 
agent is both risk- and effort-averse, and will act opportunistically. In contrast, the 
principal is risk-neutral and delegates decision-making authority to the agent. Beyond 
risk aversion, principal–agent relationships are often characterised by what might be 
called bounded rationality. That is, agents often cannot understand the goals of 
principals or do not know how to realise these goals, either because of insufficient 
guidance or because of a failure to achieve with principals. An agency problem arises, 
because the agent may not always act in the best interest of the principal. The 
principal wishes to maximise firm value, while agents seek to maximise their own 
utility. The different interests lead the rise of agency costs from principal. 
17 
 
 
There are two types of agency problems: moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral 
hazard arises when the principal cannot perfectly verify the actions of agents; and 
adverse selection results from information asymmetry, that is, private information of 
the agent’s intentions or skill level that is unavailable to the principal. The principal 
can reduce the conflict either by attempting to control the agent or by reducing the 
information asymmetry. Such efforts include active monitoring, enacting budget 
controls, or designing incentive systems to reduce dysfunctional behaviour by the 
agent. 
 
1.1 Different interests between principals and agents 
Principals expect agents to use their skill and ability with the firm’s resources to reach 
high levels of profit and to regard value maximisation of the company as their goals. 
However, although principals expect agents to follow these goals, agents instead often 
consider their own interests ahead of those of the company. Dyl (1988) indicates that 
agents may use their power to pursue their own self-interests at the expense of the 
principals if conflicting interests between them arise. In pursuit of the maximisation 
of his own interests, the manager always hopes to receive the greatest repayment on 
the material in accord with his effort. Sometimes, managers exert less effort than 
shareholders expect, even when they have the same level of incentives. In addition, 
shareholders’ interests are based on long-term company goals, but managers are often 
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interested in short-term profits. Problems can arise when managers engage in 
behaviour that optimises their own utility. For example, a manager can make short-
term unprofitable investments to increase firm size rather than long-term profitable 
investments.  
 
1.2 Differences in risk attitudes of principals and agents 
Besides the different interests between CEOs and shareholders, they also are exposed 
to different types of risk. Shareholders of the company can invest in the capital market 
to diversify their portfolio risk. However the manager’s main revenues come from the 
salary, granted stocks, or options from company. These sources of revenues mostly 
depend on the operation and development of the company. For example, if the 
company’s value suffers a loss or even descends into bankruptcy, managers will 
suffer a great personal loss. The direct loss is in the form of cash revenue such as 
reduction of the salary and bonus, while the indirect loss is the declining value of 
granted stocks and options. Moreover, the human capital resource of the manager 
could be depreciated because of the poor management skill. Hirshleifer and Thakor 
(1992) point out that in order to maintain their reputations in the human resource 
market, managers must avoid projects that are subject to early and conspicuous failure. 
We can observe that managers are more risk-averse than are shareholders. They will 
avoid innovation and choose low risks and a familiar field in which to invest to reduce 
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the potential for failure. Mishra, McConaughy, and Gobeli (2000) provide evidence to 
support the notion that a risk-averse CEO receives limited benefits from incentive pay.  
Until now, we have found that the agency problem is costly and, to a certain extent, 
one that has influenced the company’s operation and development. Thus, the 
company’s owner must find methods to alleviate the agency problem and lower the 
agency’s costs, and then ensure the manager’s behaviour conforms to shareholder 
goals. 
 
1.3 Agency cost 
Ekanayake (2004) and Eisenhardt (1989) explain in the relation between shareholders 
and managers, the monitoring problem arises because the principal cannot verify 
whether the agent has behaved appropriately. The problems of risk sharing emerge 
when the principal and the agent hold different attitudes towards risk. Agency theory 
attempts to resolve two problems relating to the agency problem: monitoring and risk 
sharing. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of monitoring 
expenditures, bonding expenditures, and residual loss. Monitoring costs are the costs 
associated with watching over the manager. Examples include making accounting 
statements and hiring auditors to verify them. Bonding costs are expenditures to prove 
that managers will limit improper efforts. Even with these types of controlling 
measures, some managerial behaviour still does not maximise owners’ wealth, with a 
resulting residual loss. 
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2. Corporate governance 
2.1 Definitions 
Corporate governance has been defined as the set of laws, policies, processes, 
customs, and institutions affecting the way a corporation is administered, directed, or 
controlled. Williamson (1984) defines corporate governance as the alignment of 
management’s interests with that of their shareholders forming a set of institutional 
arrangements. Sternberg (1998) argues that corporate governance is a way that 
shareholders act to ensure that actions of managers are directed at achieving 
established corporate objectives, that is, to ensure the shareholders receive the 
expected return and to motivate the managers to obtain the best performance for 
investors. The above arguments concentrate on the relationship between shareholders 
and managers and do not take other types of principals or agents into account. This is 
because of the different corporate governance models used in different countries. 
There are two major corporate governance models around the world: the Anglo-
American model and the non-Anglo-American model. The United States and 
Germany are prime representatives of each model. In the U.S. model, diverse groups 
of shareholders own most of the listed companies in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. By contrast, ownership structures of listed companies in Germany are 
much more concentrated and the dominant shareholders are usually the state, families, 
or commercial banks. The word stakeholder emerges when discussing the other 
parties or agents involved in corporate governance system. Freeman (1984) identifies 
stakeholders as a group that can affect or be affected by the company’s actions. 
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Stakeholders normally include shareholders, communities, investors, and other 
claimants who supply capital, as well as others such as government, suppliers, and 
employees. With the definition of corporate governance broadened to include 
stakeholders, John and Senbet (1998) in turn broaden the definition of corporate 
governance to include it as the mechanism by which the stakeholders exercise control 
over corporate insiders and management, ensuring their interests are protected. Tirole 
(2001) defines corporate governance as an institutional design that induces or forces 
management to internalise stakeholder welfare. This design of a control structure 
entails the consideration of the utilities of all stakeholders. Corporate governance 
therefore deals with the interests of stakeholders. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
According to agency theory, the separation of ownership and control results in 
different interests between the principal and the agent that can cause agency problems, 
reducing firm value. Denis and McConnell (2003) define corporate governance as the 
set of mechanisms that include both institutional and market-based mechanisms that 
will encourage managers to make decisions that can maximise the company’s value 
for its owners. Many studies have been done concerning corporate governance 
mechanisms that have included both internal and external mechanisms. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), and Fama and Jensen (1983) have proposed several 
ideas that are designed to mitigate the problem of agency and reduce its costs.  
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Internal mechanisms normally include ownership structure, board of directors, 
compensation structure, and managerial ownership, aspect generally controlled by the 
firm. The primary external mechanisms are the market for corporate control 
(managerial labour market), capital markets, and legal or regulatory issues that are 
outside of the firm’s control. Different kinds of governance mechanisms exist to help 
shareholders enhance monitoring the activities of managers and ensure that 
managerial incentives remain aligned with their own. Shareholders may also develop 
their own superior internal governance mechanisms, such as awarding incentive-based 
compensation or appointing an independent board of directors. 
 
There may be interdependence amongst these different governance mechanisms; that 
is, the optimal use of one mechanism may be complementary to, or substituted with, 
other governance mechanisms. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), using a simultaneous 
equations approach in a cross-section of firms, attempt to control for endogeneity. 
They examine seven potential control mechanisms to mitigate agency problems 
between managers and shareholders; these include both internal and external 
mechanisms found inside ownership, blockholder ownership, institutional ownership, 
outside board members, debt policy, the managerial labour market, and the market for 
corporate control. The authors present direct empirical evidence of interdependence 
amongst these mechanisms using a large sample of firms.  
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2.3 Internal Governance Mechanisms 
2.3.1 Ownership structure 
Ownership structure is one of the key elements of the corporate governance 
mechanism (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The corporate governance literature notes 
numerous instances of a separation between ownership and control within many firms. 
Shareholders usually have less information about the operation of firms than CEO. In 
addition, CEOs in modern firms are usually overpaid (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). In 
response to that assertion, firms must set effective corporate governance, and 
shareholders should monitor and oversee the decision-making process. They need to 
retain the good managers and fire the bad ones. However, there are considerable 
monitoring costs that only large shareholders can afford to bear.  
 
Indeed, the agency problem may be based on the assumption that there is a controlling 
shareholder, since large shareholders have both the interest and energy to monitor 
managers and reduce agency cost of free rider problem. Large shareholders can also 
give pressure to CEO by exercising their voting rights or using proxy fight and 
takeover if necessary. If the large shareholders have large enough share of firm, the 
incentive of reducing the agency cost is even stronger, because they have a great 
interest in controlling the company and would like to maximize the profit to grow up 
the asset. Even though large shareholders play an important role to deal with agency 
problem, they usually do not consider the interest of minority shareholders, managers 
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and other employers. Large shareholders can put themselves ahead of small 
shareholders by paying special dividend to themselves and exploiting business 
relationship for themselves. Furthermore, other stakeholders, such as creditors’ 
interest may also be expropriated. Large shareholders tend to invest in risky projects 
where they enjoy the upside potential returns and creditors bear all the excessive risk 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
 
Berle and Means (1932) indicate that a company with dispersed shareholders has less 
incentive to monitor managers. The presence of many small shareholders means they 
have no real power in running the firm or even monitoring performance of CEOs. In 
this case, the CEO has easy access to the firm’s resources. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
point out that in a corporation with many small owners, the shareholders will not pay 
all the monitoring costs, because they will receive no corresponding gain.  
 
Ownership structures in the United States and other developed countries, such as the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, vary. Denis and McConnell (2003) summarise 
the ownership of these countries respectively as follows. Evidence from the United 
Kingdom’s history of equity ownership is similar to that of the United States in which 
the shares of most publicly traded firms are relatively widely held. Evidence from 
Germany and Japan shows a history of equity ownership that is more concentrated 
than that of the United States. Moreover, banks in Germany and Japan play more 
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important roles in governance. Prowse (1992) discusses the concentrated ownership 
of Japanese firms, noting the most important blockholders in Japan are the financial 
institutions, which hold larger numbers of equity positions in firms than the United 
States. Franks and Mayer (2001) find that ownership in German firms is characterised 
by very high levels of concentration especially associated with holdings by other 
firms and families. Faccio and Lang (2002) use a large dataset that includes 5,232 
corporations to examine the ownership and control in 13 Western European countries. 
They summarise that widely held ownership structures are adopted more often in the 
United Kingdom and Ireland, and family-controlled firms are more important in 
continental Europe. 
 
2.3.2 Board of directors 
The board of directors is the link between shareholders and management. The major 
role of the board is to protect shareholder wealth and ensure a return on investment. A 
board of directors is the collective group of individuals elected by shareholders to 
monitor the firm’s management. Most international corporations have boards of 
directors. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the key internal corporate mechanism 
for shareholders (owners) is a board of directors whose function is to resolve agency 
problems due to separate ownership and control. The board of directors representing 
shareholders’ interests and is normally appointed by large shareholders within the 
corporation. Fama (1980) considers a board of directors to be a low-cost mechanism 
of governance when comparing with other options, such as takeovers executive. 
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Brown and Brown (1999) argue that the board aims to be involved in long-term 
strategic planning, objectives, and interests of the owner. In other words, the board of 
directors is a line of defence that ensures a successful alignment of managers’ 
interests with those of shareholders and opposes those managers who would act 
contrarily towards shareholders. 
 
The primary functions of boards are to hire, fire, monitor, compensate management, 
arrange the voting process on important decisions such as mergers and acquisitions, 
the firm’s capital structure, and so forth (Denis and McConnell, 2003; Becht et al., 
2002). The board of directors is often considered as a legally constituted body acting 
collectively rather than as a mere group whose members serve in individual capacities.  
 
The determinants of board structure and board composition have attracted wide 
attention in corporate governance literatures. Good board structure and board 
composition could bring more benefits to shareholders and reduce extensive 
monitoring cost. Fama and Jensen (1983) indicate that both internal and external 
directors should apply as part of board composition. Internal directors deal with 
company’s complex operation process. Meanwhile, external directors engage with 
monitoring top managers activity and decision making process. External directors 
usually hold majority of board seats to ensure board independence. Shareholders will 
produce a large amount of incentive to external directors to make them not collude 
with top managers. The increase of internal directors will produce reduction of board 
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independence and the increase of external directors will result in excessive monitoring 
cost. Construct a proper board composition should be the leading issue to 
shareholders. Boone et al. (2007) conclude a large number of factors could affect 
board structure and board composition using U.S. dataset.  They put those factors into 
three main categories names scope of operation, monitoring and negotiation. Under 
scope of operation assumption, board size and proportion of independent directors 
strongly related to firm size, firm age and number of business segments. Under 
monitoring assumption, board size effect by free cash flow, industry concentration 
and takeover defence. However, board independence is less effect by those factors. 
Under negotiation assumption, proportion of independent directors is determined by 
CEO tenure, CEO ownership, outside director ownership and so forth.  Linck et al. 
(2008) also adopted a comprehensive investigation on board structure and board 
composition. They applied almost 7,000 firms from 1990 to 2004 in U.S. and found 
board size become smaller with more independent in 1990s. They also indicate that 
firm choose board structure based on costs and benefits of monitoring and advising. 
Larger firms tend to have larger and more independent boards. Guest (2008) 
summarised recent development on board size and composition in both U.S. and U.K. 
from 1995 to 2008. They also applied U.K. data to compare those evidences from U.S. 
and found board structure are not determined by monitoring related factors. Dittmann 
et al. (2010) emphasize that board size in Germany is largely determined by law and 
half of board members should worker representatives1.  
                                                          
1 German co-determination act does not apply to smaller companies with less than 2,000 employees, where the 
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The board of directors thus is an essential component of a large firm in modern 
society, including corporate and non-corporate organisations. Many scholars in the 
fields of economics and finance have studied this topic, and much evidence abounds 
concerning the effectiveness of board of directors across many countries. Warther 
(1998) models the board with a utility function significantly aligned with shareholder 
interests in order to accomplish its monitoring function. This alignment can be 
achieved by linking the directors’ compensation with the firm’s value. On the one 
hand, numerous companies have adopted stock incentive-based compensation plans 
for their directors, arguing that such plans serve to better align directors and 
shareholders. On the other hand, incentive pay may jeopardise a board’s focus, 
independence, and integrity. In this situation, a board may focus on short-term instead 
of long-term performance. Cordeiro, Veliyath, and Eramus (2000) find that the 
director’s total compensation is unrelated to firm performance. However, Benito and 
Conyon (1999) observe a positive relation between directors’ cash compensation and 
firm performance for a sample of U.K. companies. Moreover, the board of directors is 
always concern about its reputation, a concern that shareholders can exploit to ensure 
alignment of their interests. The board’s effectiveness in executing its monitoring 
function is determined by its independence, size, and composition. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2001) surmise that the quality of board decisions is somewhat influenced 
by its composition and size when they face issues of CEO replacement, acquisition, 
executive compensation, and so forth. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
required proportion of worker representatives is only one third. 
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2.3.3 CEO compensation 
One possible method to reduce agency problem is executive compensation plans, that 
is, how to structure the contractual relation between the principal and the agent to 
provide appropriate incentives for the latter to make decisions that will maximise the 
former’s wealth. Becht et al. (2002) propose that the structure of executive 
compensation contracts can have a large influence in aligning shareholders and 
management’s interests; hence, proper incentive design can decrease agency cost. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) also pointed out that an appropriate compensation 
package can reduce agency costs.  
 
According to Stephenson (2004), executive compensation system should accomplish 
three important goals. Firstly, executives should be rewarded for their long-term 
performance rather than simply for meeting short-term goals. Stock options, which 
usually are used as long-term incentives, should have shorter option terms and longer 
vesting periods to reduce short-run interest and retain good talent. Restricted shares 
are another option whereby the settle values are assessed at the end of tenure. 
Secondly, the goal is to ensure that all executive should not be treated accordingly to 
an identical standard. Executive compensation should reflect different degrees of 
market complexity and decision-making accountability. Thirdly, executive 
compensation should be clearly explained to all shareholders and investor: its 
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structure, the amount of reward, whether a match exists between performance and 
reward, and so forth.  
 
2.3.3.1 Optimal contract 
When complete monitoring is possible, a first-best solution can be achieved by 
employing an enforceable contract that penalises dysfunctional behaviour. Generally, 
complete monitoring is either impossible or prohibitively costly; thus, only an 
imperfect estimator of actions can be used in contracting. Optimal contracts will be a 
second-best solution, because of the problem of moral hazard. By using additional 
information about the agent’s actions, contracts generally can be improved 
(Holmstrom, 1979).  
 
Agency theory implies that the optimal contract is the one in which there is a balance 
between fixed forms of compensation and variable forms of compensation that are 
contingent on performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest a mix of pay as a 
mechanism to resolve the agency problem. In the 1950s, Patton (1955) defined 
compensation as salary, bonus, and deferred payment. The total pay package of a 
CEO increases the content and usually consists of salary, short-term and long-term 
incentive awards, benefits, and others. Hoskisson et al. (1989) state CEO 
compensation is an important governance mechanism that helps align the interest of 
agents with principals. Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) point out that the short-term 
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executive compensation is effective. Long-term incentives can include stock 
ownership, stock option, and so forth. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) note that the 
different components in the mix of top management compensation reflect a shared 
risk between principles and agents. 
 
2.3.3.2 Managerial power 
Good internal governance mechanism could reduce agency cost and maximum 
shareholder’s wealth. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors with their 
incentives should carry out monitoring task and do not collude with managers to 
expropriate shareholder’s residuals. That is effective internal governance component 
like independent directors could constrain the influence of powerful CEO, which 
results in strong pay-performance relationship. From managerial power point of view, 
the making process of CEO compensation contract is not purely independent. The 
compensation package is not only related to firm’s performance which represent best 
interests of shareholders, but it’s related to some factors that shareholders could not 
easily to observe. CEO has sufficient power to influence compensation setting and 
decision making process. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) constructed a comprehensive 
view of managerial power approach. They indicated that managerial power approach 
could not complete substitute optimal contract approach. However, managerial power 
approach served as substantial supplement with those outcomes could not explained 
alone by optimal contract approach. Under managerial power approach, CEOs use 
their power to influence board and compensation committee to generate excess 
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payment that higher than what they should receive under optimal contract. They 
called this behaviour as rents extraction. Higher managerial power lead higher rents 
extraction. If independent director or member of compensation committee is friend of 
CEO or appointed by CEO, they could easily cooperate with CEO to setting 
compensation package. Lambert et al. (1993) find that CEOs receive higher pay when 
part of the board is appointed by them. 
 
Managerial power determined by several factors. Finkelstein (1992) argues that 
manager’s power could express from four aspects names structural power, ownership 
power, expert power and prestige power. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) indicate that 
managerial power depends on ownership structure and board composition.  They 
argue that firm with concentred ownership have greater monitoring power to monitor 
CEO and board. It results in reduction of CEO managerial power. From this point of 
view, rents extraction problem is more influenced in U.S. and U.K. companies with 
dispersed ownership.  
 
2.3.3.3 Structure of CEO compensation 
Short-term compensation 
Salary is the basic form of CEO compensation and is a general form of payment many 
companies adopt. The level of salary depends on several factors, such as work 
experience, age, educational background, and so forth. Salary is set annually and will 
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not change frequently after setting. O’Rourke (1998) addresses the role of salary in 
the compensation package as the tool to attract and retain high quality human 
resources. Ogden and Watson (2004) indicate that salary reflects the demand and 
supply equilibrium price in the human resource market. Baker et al. (1988) relate the 
salary increase to the promotion of executives in order to examine the incentive effect. 
They find that salary only shows a significant increase when it is associated with a 
promotion. Murphy (1999) notes that salary is a good incentive for risk-averse CEOs 
because they naturally prefer an increase in dollars received rather than other variable 
of compensation. 
 
Bonus is another component of short-term compensation, providing incremental cash 
compensation to base salary (Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995). The amount of 
the CEO’s bonus usually correlates to objective company performance, such as profit, 
return on equity, growth in sales, and so forth. Short-term accounting-based measures 
act as the core. The above characteristic of the bonus makes its incentive function on 
the manager exceed the salary. Although the annual salary- and bonus-based 
compensation system can reflect the manager’s contribution to the company, it cannot 
incentivise long-term behaviour of the executive, unless long-term bonuses are part of 
the package. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) indicate that the bonus payment as an 
incentive may cause problems, because the bonus is usually paid based on the firm’s 
performance in the current fiscal year, suggesting the bonus cannot offer an incentive, 
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considered over the long run. For example, when a company is under merger, 
acquisition, or involved in other long-term investment, returns on these investments 
cannot be embodied in the current year’s accounting figures, which could be very low 
or even zero in the initial year of investment. Considering the personal revenues of 
salary and bonus, a CEO might conduct some quick but risky business during his 
tenure rather than engage in a project with a long return period. Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) apply the pay–performance model and use the change of firm wealth as the 
measurement of company performance. They find that although a bonus accounts for 
a significant part of the whole compensation, it bears no relation to firm performance. 
Baker et al. (1988) explain such an insensitivity of the bonus to firm performance as 
its basis on the whole company’s performance, which reflects the collective effort of 
all the firm’s employees rather than the CEO’s individual contribution.  
 
Long-term compensation 
Granted stocks are defined as the value of restricted stocks granted during the year. 
Granting stock to a CEO is a kind of long-term incentive to associate the CEO’s 
interest with the performance of company, because the value of the stock directly 
relates to his or her own interests. Hoskisson et al. (1989) state that the stock-based 
incentive plan attributes more risk-sharing to agents and principals. When one CEO 
owns all the stock of a company, the relationship between principal and agent does 
not exist at that moment. The incentive problem will fully to be solved. Murphy (1985) 
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finds the compensation package that includes a stock-based component is 
significantly related to the performance of company when examining Fortune 500 U.S. 
companies. However, in the real business world, most CEOs own only a few shares of 
stock or even none at all. Kole (1997) reveals that granted stocks are more common in 
research-and-development intensive firms than in non-research-and-development ones. 
 
Stock options are defined as the aggregate value of all options granted to the 
executive during the year as valued by the company. Stock options are a type of 
compensation that were formerly awarded as executive long-term incentives. They 
emerged in the United States in the 1980s, growing quickly throughout the 1990s in 
U.S.-European business circles. The main benefit of stock options in principle-agent 
theory as a compensation to CEOs is that they can motivate the manager to act on 
behalf of the shareholder’s interest by maximising the value of the firm when they 
meet choice. In addition, stock option remuneration can attract and retain excellent 
and capable workers (Hall and Murphy, 2003). Finally, it can mitigate cash flow 
during financial constraints, helping the company compensate for a lack of liquidity, 
because it does not need to reward its executives with this form of remuneration 
immediately. If the CEO is granted stocks rather than options, he may focus on short-
term profit to boost the share price in order to acquire greater compensation rather 
than concentrating on long-term plans and development of the company. 
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2.4 External Governance Mechanisms 
2.4.1 Managerial labour market 
The managerial takeover market is an important external mechanism for shareholders 
and firm governance. It serves as the last monitor of shareholders to regulate 
managers. The study of top executive turnover is a major area of research in corporate 
governance mechanism. The literature is replete with examples of executive takeover 
and its link to firm performance, for replacing the executive often brings major 
change within firms, if they are grappling with financial woes or continuous poor 
performance. Fama (1980) points out that the managerial labour market applies direct 
pressure on firms concerning how to compensate managers and how to dispose of 
them, according to how well or poorly the firm performs. Moreover, when the firm’s 
compensation system is unresponsive to good performance, managers will leave. A 
competitive managerial labour market provides the manager with information into 
human capital regarding to their past performance. It will determine the pay level of 
the managers in the future. For example, managers will maximise firm value and 
shareholder interest throughout the period of their contract, because it suits their own 
best interests. Therefore, an executive’s personal reputation in the managerial labour 
market is an important disciplinary tool for shareholders to wield. 
 
Martin and McConnell (1991) indicate that the takeover market plays an important 
role for discipline as regards executive managers. Shareholders can monitor executive 
37 
 
managers’ performance, controlling them to align both parties’ interests. Denis and 
Denis (1995) examine the relationship between management turnover and 
improvement of firm performance, and find that large and significant operating 
performance declines will force changes in top management, with a significant 
improvement of operating performance expected to follow. The corporate takeover 
market in the United Kingdom is also active. Franks and Mayer (1996) examine 
hostile takeovers taken on as a discipline function on governance. On the one hand, 
they find that takeovers are associated with high levels of change on the board of 
directors. On the other hand, the takeover market in many countries is not active or 
even nonexistent.  
 
2.4.2 Legal and regulatory systems 
Other external governance mechanisms are legal and regulatory systems. La Porta et 
al. (2000) indicate that legal protection of investors can be regarded as a potentially 
useful way to monitor corporate governance. Over the past two decades, many 
researchers have generated evidence revealing cross-country differences in corporate 
governance. Each nation’s different financial systems depend on the quality of legal 
rules, regulations, and investor rights in the respective countries. Shareholders’ and 
creditors’ capabilities and rights in turn are influenced by these legal rules and 
regulations. Thus, insuring their interests of investment requires a high level of 
protection.  
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Roe (2003) finds that compared with countries that practice laissez-faire economics, 
many social-democratic countries prefer to establish regulations to protect workers’ 
rights instead of shareholders’ interests. These countries have more concentrated 
ownership structures and a larger labour influence in corporate governance with 
weaker shareholder protection. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that some countries have 
powerful controlling shareholders, from both political and economic perspectives. 
Politicians can establish laws to entrench shareholders and reduce minority rights. A 
number of empirical studies have demonstrated that common law countries provide 
better investor protection than do civil law countries. La Porta et al. (1997) offer three 
equity-based financial measurements and find all three measurements reflect higher 
investor protection in common law countries compared with civil law countries, 
especially in France. La Porta et al. (1999, 2000) provide more evidence comparing 
investor protection in civil law-based countries and common law countries. They 
show that shareholders in United States and the United Kingdom enjoy a greater 
degree of legal protection with common law systems. These countries have more 
advanced financial markets, more dispersed ownership, and more efficient capital 
allocation across firms. 
Overall, such evidences gives support to a structure encompassing legislation, 
regulations, and rules in corporate governance in different countries. Legal systems 
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are not regulating corporate activities in a vacuum. Instead, companies must adapt to 
the limitations of the comprehensive regulation environment in which they operate. 
 
3. Corporate governance in China 
3.1 Background of Corporate Governance in China 
Corporate governance in China has been proposed and improved against the back 
drop of reform and the policy of the opening-up of trade and commerce to a global 
economy. As China has sought to develop an economy encompassing commodities 
and a free market, this has required that state-owned factories under the planned 
economy transform themselves into joint-stock companies. Upon the establishment of 
the Company Law and China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
corporate governance in China has become gradually driven by laws and markets. 
 
3.1.1 State-owned factories under the planned economy transform into 
joint-stock companies under the market economy 
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China adopted the 
planned economy, with the national economy becoming wholly dependent on 
government directives. All economic entities lacked the right of autonomy. During 
this period, the state-owned economy completely dominated all commercial sectors, 
and the government was the only contributor for state-owned companies with 
ownerships and the right to operate. State-owned companies conducted activities 
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under administrative orders by the government, which planned and arranged the 
procurement of raw materials, production of goods, realisation of marketing, and 
distribution of products. Financially, these companies implemented unified collection 
and allocation. All corporate profits and depreciations were wholly handed over as 
part of the government budget. Necessary funds for production, such as basic 
construction funds, replacement and renovation funds for fixed assets, and technical 
innovation funds were allocated uniformly by the government. Even the current funds 
had to be appropriated by the financial authority. Companies were deprived of the 
rights to manage their finances and to operate independently. After the reform in 
1978, China gradually transformed its central planned economy system into the 
commodity economy system and market economy system, which required the market 
to begin functioning as the basic tool for allocating resources and the government to 
relinquish its role of economic dominance and assume a part as adjuster and regulator. 
The government began granting power and profits to SOEs that obtained the right to 
operate independently. After the joint-stock reform, state-owned companies clarified 
relations between ownership and management and converted to joint-stock companies 
in which the internal governance structure must be built up simultaneously to form 
the complete corporate governance structure. This redefining of the boundary 
between rights and profits enabled owners and agents to understand more clearly their 
own duties and perform properly for maximising corporate value and ownership 
wealth.  
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3.1.2 Corporate governance requirements for Chinese companies that 
compete in the international market 
Since China has carried out the reform and opening-up policy, Chinese enterprises 
have gained many opportunities to participate in international trading. Meanwhile, 
they were tapping into the international market. Especially after China’s entry into the 
WTO, China intensified its participation in international economic trading and market 
competition, which required domestic companies to comply with international 
corporate governance standards. Participants in international competition, especially 
large cross-national companies, constructed modern corporate system with clearly 
established ownership rights and defined obligations. However, due to imperfect 
internal corporate governance, unclear definitions of rights, obligations, and profits, 
low-efficiency of operating and limited capabilities of participating in international 
competition, Chinese companies were in the dry tree. Chinese enterprises that 
intended to compete internationally needed to learn how to establish modern 
corporate systems and perfect corporate governance structures.  
 
3.2 Three Stages of Corporate Governance Reform in China 
The reform of corporate governance in China can be divided into three phases. The 
first was the preliminary stage (1978-1992) during which the government granted 
power to companies, and corporate governance drew great attention, as the reform of 
the management system of state-owned companies. The second was the exploration 
stage (1993-2002) during which most companies conducted joint-stock reforms, and 
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all joint-stock companies were required to establish perfectly the internal corporate 
governance system according to Company Law. The third was and continues to be the 
improvement and mature-development stage (2003-present) during which the 
governance system of Chinese companies has been standardised and boosted in terms 
of the enactment of new Company Law. Corporate governance began to achieve 
positive effects on corporate development.  
 
3.2.1 Preliminary stage for corporate governance reform in China (1978-
1992) 
With the 1978 reform and opening-up policy, China generalised its household 
contract responsibility system and extended it to all domestic cities in the 1980s. The 
reform of SOEs was important. To energise the state-owned economy, the model of 
centralised management required changing, and companies were granted power to 
awaken their motivation to pursue private enterprise. After several experiments, 
officials and scholars diverged markedly in respect to paths of reform. Some 
suggested a responsibility system and some suggested a joint-stock system, with the 
government finally selecting the former. From 1984-1993, there were two rounds of 
responsibility system executed throughout the nation. Wen and Zhang (2009) 
conclude that the responsibility system evoked the passion of employees and 
contractors, and increased the operating benefits of the companies as well. However, 
as companies’ residual right to control and residual claims were handed over to 
contractors, the benefit conflict between corporate owners and contractors intensified, 
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and owners’ benefit was damaged. Moreover, unclear ownership was adverse to 
corporate governance. Under the spread of the responsibility system, the joint-stock 
system started to be experimented with the support of some local governments and 
generalised universally by replacing the responsibility system. To implement the 
joint-stock system, companies must construct a corporate governance structure and set 
up shareholders’ meetings, and establish boards of directors and supervisors to clarify 
each party’s obligations and rights according to law. Thus did initial corporate 
governance emerge in the earliest joint-stock companies of China. 
 
At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, thousands of companies 
experimented with the joint-stock system throughout the nation with the experimental 
areas extending from coastal regions into the mainland. Experimental companies 
included small state-owned companies, and later, medium and large state-owned 
companies. In addition, financial investors covered such firms domestically and then 
internationally. The increased quantity of joint-stock companies inspired related 
stakeholders to advocate for the circulation of stock, triggering the emergence of 
stock trading at the end of the 1980s, culminating with the founding of the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange at the beginning of the 1990s. The stock exchange 
stipulated strict listing regulations and guidelines, especially governance structure 
rules for companies to be listed, which further enhanced the governance structure of 
joint-stock companies.  
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3.2.2 Exploration stage for corporate governance reform in China (1993-
2002) 
The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some 
Issues Concerning the Establishment of the Socialist Market Economy was approved 
at the 3rd session of the 14th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 
November 1993, which put forward the establishment of a socialist market economy 
system. It was also pointed out that the operation mechanism of state-owned 
companies should be transformed to adapt to the demands of the market economy and 
offer a modern corporate system featuring clear ownership, clarified rights and 
obligations, separation of government functions, and enterprise management.  
 
The first Company Law of China was approved at the 5th session of the Standing 
Committee of the 8th National People’s Congress on 29 December 1993, which 
clearly specifies the requirements of the corporate governance structure, referring to 
the establishment of shareholders’ meetings, board of directors, board of supervisors, 
and the position of managers in a joint-stock company. Companies registered in the 
administration for industry and commerce should come into strict accord with the 
Company Law and create a comprehensive corporate governance structure. Corporate 
governance has become a compulsory requirement for the establishment and 
operation of companies.  
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On 21 August 1996, the CSRC formally issued Measures for the Administration of 
Stock Exchange2, amongst which Article IV stipulates ‘all stock exchanges shall be 
regulated and administered by the CSRC’. Securities registration and settlement 
institutions established in the stock exchange also shall be ‘regulated and 
administered by the CSRC’. Meanwhile, all nominees for ‘chairman, vice chairman, 
CEO, and deputy general manager’ of a stock exchange shall be ‘nominated by the 
CSRC and submitted to the local people’s government before being selected or 
appointed by the board’. The administration of a stock exchange therefore was 
transferred to the central government and made uniform throughout the nation. 
Subsequently, the central government adopted uniform corporate governance for 
listed companies, such as the issuance of Governance Rules for Listed Companies and 
a proposal for establishing independent director systems for listed companies. 
Stringent laws and rules as well as strict regulation by stock exchanges drove the 
corporate governance structure of to-be-listed companies. 
 
China joined the WTO in 2001, which brought both competition and challenges for 
Chinese companies. Compared with international competitors, Chinese companies 
were weak in many aspects primarily arising from incomplete governance structures, 
                                                          
2 Temporary Measures for the Administration of Stock Exchange, issued by the CSRC 7 July 1993, was abolished 
at the time. 
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unclear separation of internal rights and obligations, undefined rewards and penalties, 
and insufficient incentives. Because China was open to the world and welcomed 
international competitors, some Chinese companies attempted international trade. 
Compared with the regulations of the Chinese stock exchange, Western countries 
have more complete legal systems. As a result, Chinese companies needed to reform 
both their management operations and corporate governance structure to be listed on 
foreign exchanges.  
 
During this exploration stage, companies generally established relatively complete 
corporate governance mechanisms. The level of corporate governance was 
dramatically improved. However, numerous conflicts in Chinese companies typically 
emerged, such as a fragmentation of authority and a lack of property representatives 
in state-owned companies. Generally, the corporate governance structure did not 
function as effectively as was expected, and the reform needed to be furthered.  
 
3.2.3 Improvement and mature-development stage for corporate 
governance reform in China (2003-present) 
After the convening of 16th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, China 
deepened its reform of its economic system. The reform of the shareholder structure 
improved the standards of corporate governance for listed companies. After the new 
Company Law was issued in 2006, the corporate governance system gradually came 
in line with international conventions.  
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Prepared according to European and American laws, its formal issuance enhanced the 
purposes of corporate governance and stipulation that shareholders have audit rights. 
Minority shareholders have the right to request, convene, and preside over 
shareholders’ meetings. Cumulative voting system can be carried out in accordance 
with the articles of association or resolutions at shareholders’ meetings when directors 
and supervisors are elected therein.  
 
At the beginning of 21st century, the reform regarding the management system of 
state-owned assets was accelerated. After more than ten years of reform, most state-
owned companies had completed joint-stock reform and transformed into joint-stock 
companies with better internal governance structures. As promoted by the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC), this new round of reform for central government-controlled companies 
focussed on listing by combining primary corporate assets and businesses. The 
holistic listing further enhanced corporate governance, improved the timeliness and 
effectiveness of information disclosure, and strengthened regulations of corporate 
activities. Meanwhile, SASAC emphasised the construction of an independent 
directors’ system and external supervisors’ function, and reformed the remuneration 
system for executive management. Overall, SASAC has played an important role in 
promoting the construction of a modern corporate system in state-owned companies.  
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3.3 Internal Governance Mechanism in Listed Companies of 
China 
3.3.1 Ownership structure of listed companies in China 
The unique ownership structure is a key feature of Chinese-listed firms. There is a 
highly concentrated shareholding structure, with severe restrictions on share-
ownership transfer. The most important characteristic of China’s listed firms is their 
state shareholdings. A typical listed Chinese stock company has a mixed ownership 
structure composed of the state, legal persons, and domestic individual investors. 
Each of the three predominant shareholders holds about one-third of all shares. The 
state retains control of about three-quarters of all shares, making it the controlling 
owner of most listed companies (Fung and Leung, 2001). 
 
In the early stage, Xu and Wang (1999) were the first to divide ownership structure by 
nature of shares into four groups: state, legal person, domestic individuals, and 
foreign-owned shares. They posit different performance occurs under different types 
of shares. 
 
State shares are those held directly by central or local government, which are 
represented by local financial bureaus and the state asset management department. 
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The ultimate owner of state shares is the State Council of China. In addition, state 
shares can be held by the parent of the listed firms, especially an SOE. State shares 
are not tradable but can be transferred to a domestic institution upon approval of the 
CSRC. 
 
Legal person shares are shares owned by domestic institutions. Legal person holding 
can be classified as state-owned legal person shares and public legal person shares. 
Domestic institutions include industrial enterprises, power companies, trust and 
investment companies, securities companies, foundations and funds, banks, 
construction and real estate development companies, and so forth. Legal person shares 
are also not tradable but can be transferred to domestic institution upon approval of 
the CSRC. 
 
Domestic individuals’ shares are classified as tradable A-shares3, and can be held 
and traded mostly by individuals or some domestic institutions. There is no restriction 
on the number of shares traded or on holding periods. These shares are the only type 
of stock tradable amongst domestic investors. However, tradable A-shares are to 
account for no less than 25% of total outstanding shares when a company makes its 
initial public offering (IPO). 
                                                          
3 A-shares are issued by domestic companies and are held and traded in Chinese Yuan (RMB) by domestic 
investors only. 
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Foreign shares are available exclusively to foreign investors and some authorised 
domestic securities firms. Foreign shares include B-shares4 and H-shares5. 
 
Du and Liu (2002) use the same criteria to investigate the relationship between 
performance and share types. The advantage of this classification method is that it 
incorporates the priority held by state shares. The disadvantage is that the legal-person 
share is too vague to define whether it belongs to state shares or public shares. Chen 
et al. (2009) also indicate this classification method is problematic when dealing with 
legal person shares.  
 
Later on, many researchers use the largest shareholder as the dominant shareholder to 
distinguish company ownership type. Performance outcomes under different 
ownership are mixed (Chen and Xu, 2001, Wu, 2002, Bai et al., 2005, Firth, Fung, 
and Rui, 2006, 2007). Many of the largest shareholders are not the actual controllers 
of their companies. For example, the Ministry of Education cannot hold the stock 
directly for itself but could gain control of the listed companies via the parent 
                                                          
4 B-shares are stocks issued by domestic companies registered on the mainland, but traded in hard currency by 
foreign investors, including overseas Chinese and individuals and institutions from foreign countries as well as 
from Hong Kong (China), Macao, and Taiwan (China). Individual domestic investors have been allowed to trade 
B-shares since February 2001. 
5 H-shares are issued and listed by domestic companies in Hong Kong (China). 
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company. Thus, classifying the parent company as a non-SOE category is strictly 
improper but reflects weakness of a company’s actual ownership type. 
 
La Porta et al. (1999) introduce the concept of the ‘ultimate controller’, followed by 
Liu et al. (2003) as the first to apply ultimate ownership theory to Chinese corporate 
governance research. More recently, Xia and Fang (2005), Xu et al. (2006), and Chen 
et al. (2009) also use the term ‘ultimate controller’ to divide all Chinese-listed 
companies into different subgroups.  
 
I have divided Chinese companies into four categories: SOEs administered by the 
central government, SOEs administered by local governments, non-state-owned 
companies (individual or family control), and foreign companies (wholly foreign-
owned, joint venture, partnership). Current laws restrict foreign companies be listed in 
domestic securities markets. Therefore, listed companies in domestic securities 
markets are divided into three categories: state-owned listed companies under the 
administration of the central government, state-owned listed companies under the 
administration of local governments, and non-state-owned listed companies. 
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3.3.1.1 SOEs under the administration of the central government 
State-owned listed companies under the administration of the central government are 
charged and administered by the central government or the central state-owned assets 
administration with huge quantity and scale of corporate assets as well as a large 
number of employees. In respect to shareholding structure, the holding ratio of state-
owned shareholders is normally higher than 50%. In some significant industries, it 
even exceeds 90%. State-owned listed companies under the administration of the 
central government can be classified mainly into three categories. 
 
The first category refers to listed companies administered by SASAC under the State 
Council and held by central government. National law stipulates that SASAC under 
the State Council represents the government in performing contributors’ obligations 
for companies and takes responsibilities for performance assessment, employee 
appointment, and significant investment decisions. Such companies usually have 
high-quality core assets packed and listed, and absolutely control at least one listed 
company. They are mainly distributed across military, petroleum, chemical, power, 
metallurgy, coal, and other mineral resources industries as well as large equipment 
manufacturing, vehicle, and commercial aircraft manufacturing, telecommunication, 
aviation, shipping, architecture, construction, real estate development, and seaport 
industries. 
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The second category refers to listed companies jointly controlled by the Ministry of 
Finance and Huijin Company. They normally cover banking, trusts, securities, and 
insurance industries.  
 
The third category refers to listed companies controlled by other departments and 
authorities related to the central government, such as Guang-Shen Railway, Da-Qin 
Railway controlled by the Ministry of Railways, and Sunny Loantop controlled by 
China Tobacco Group. These are normally state monopolies in which companies 
controlled by state administration are entrusted to perform contributors’ 
responsibilities.  
 
3.3.1.2 SOEs under the administration of local governments 
SOEs under the administration of local governments are administered by local 
governments or LAMBs with small quantities and scale of assets and a small number 
of employees. In respect to shareholding structure, the proportion of shareholding 
depends mainly on the industrial features of the listed companies and regional 
influence. Companies belonging to competitive industries have a relatively low 
proportion of state holding; companies that have significant local influence or are 
monopolies or that belong to public utility industries have a relatively high proportion 
of state holding. State-owned listed companies under the administration of local 
governments can be divided into two categories. 
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The first category refers to listed companies administered by LAMBs. These 
companies mainly cover airports, seaports, key roads, urban water supply, gas supply, 
electric power supply, public transportation, metallurgy, coal, and other mineral 
resources industries, as well as equipment manufacturing, vehicle, and industry 
monopolies.  
 
The second category refers to listed companies administered by other local 
government bureaus. The government usually has a great impact on these companies. 
 
3.3.1.3 Non-state-owned listed companies 
Non-state-owned listed companies (non-SOEs) are normally set up and controlled by 
families or individuals with direct contributions. Securities markets of China were 
mainly towards SOEs at the beginning of establishment and as private companies 
developed and played an important role in the national economy, securities markets 
started to accept non-SOEs to be listed later on. In addition, major shareholders 
universally and absolutely control non-SOEs. However, the proportion of their 
dominate shareholding is not as high as that of SOEs. 
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3.3.2 Shareholders’ meeting 
According to the Company Law 6 , the shareholders’ meeting, consisting of all 
shareholders acting as the authority of the company, shall exercise the following 
duties: to decide the operating guidance and investment plans; to elect and replace 
directors and supervisors not represented by employees; to decide the remuneration of 
directors and supervisors; to review and approve reports of the board of supervisors; 
to review and approve annual financial budget proposals and final accounts; to review 
and approve profit distribution proposals and deficit recovery proposals; to make 
resolutions on the increase or decrease of registered capital; to make resolutions on 
the issuance of corporate bonds; to make resolutions on the merger, separation, 
dissolution, liquidation, and change of corporate form; to revise the articles of 
association; to exercise other duties specified in the articles of association.  
 
According to Regulations on the Shareholders’ Meeting of Listed Companies7and 
Guidance on the Articles of Association of Listed Companies 8 , the shareholders’ 
meeting of listed companies shall review and discuss significant issues of the 
company, such as the purchase or sale of significant assets within one year that 
exceeds 30% of audited assets and provision of external guarantees that have material 
impact on the operation of the company.  
 
                                                          
6 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, revised and approved at the 18th meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the 10th National People Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 27 October 2005.  
7 Regulations on the Shareholders’ Meeting of Listed Companies (Z.J.F.[2006]21). 
8 Guidance on the Articles of Association of Listed Companies (Z.J.G.S.Z.[2006]38). 
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All governance guidelines and reports issued or being issued by different countries 
always recognise and support the control functions of the shareholders’ meeting, 
highlight shareholders’ participation, and detail shareholders’ rights. However, in 
China, since the equity is held mainly by a small number of shareholders, when the 
company transforms into a joint-stock concern, the shareholders’ meeting itself is 
reduced to a mere formality; minority shareholders, whether they attend shareholders’ 
meetings or not, cannot affect decided procedures and content. 
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3.3.3 Board of directors 
The board of directors is responsible to the shareholders’ meeting, and exercises its 
duties according to Company Law: to convene shareholders’ meetings and report 
work to the shareholders’ meeting; to implement the resolutions of the shareholders’ 
meeting; to decide the operating plan and investment proposal; to prepare the annual 
financial budget proposal and final accounts; to prepare the profit distribution 
proposal and deficit recovery proposal; to prepare proposals on the increase or 
decrease of registered capital and issuance of corporate bonds; to prepare proposals on 
the merger, separation, dissolution, liquidation, and change of corporate form; to 
decide the setup of internal management organisation; to decide the appointment or 
dismissal of managers and their remuneration and decide the appointment or dismissal 
of deputy managers, financial managers upon managers’ nomination and their 
remuneration; to stipulate basic management rules; to exercise other duties specified 
in the articles of association.  
 
According to Governance Principles for Listed Companies and Guiding Opinion on 
Establishment of Independent Director Systems by Listed Companies issued by the 
CSRC, listed companies must set up an independent director system. The board of 
directors of listed companies shall include independent directors comprising at least 
one-third. Independent directors must be independent from the company and major 
shareholders, and may not take any other position in this listed company. Independent 
directors may perform duties independently without being affected by major 
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shareholders, ultimate controllers, and any other companies or individuals that are 
interested parties of the listed company. To fully function, independent directors shall 
be entitled with the following special authorities from the listed company except for 
those specified in laws and regulations: major related transactions (referring to 
transactions that the listed company intends to conclude with the related party and 
whose total value exceeds 3,000,000 Chinese Yuan (RMB) or 5% of the company’s 
net assets audited recently) should be approved by the independent directors before 
being submitted to the board of directors for discussion; before the independent 
directors make their judgment, an intermediary agency can be employed to produce 
an independent financial advisory report, which will serve as the basis for their 
judgment. The independent directors can put forward the proposal to the board of 
directors relating to the appointment or removal of the accounting firm; they can 
propose to the board of directors to call an interim shareholders’ meeting; they can 
propose to call a meeting of the board of directors; they can appoint an external 
auditing or consulting organisation independently; they can solicit the proxies before 
the convening of the shareholders’ meeting. Consent from more than half of all the 
independent directors shall be obtained if an independent director desires to exercise 
the above-mentioned power. In addition, independent directors shall express 
independent opinions on the major events occurred in the listed company. They shall 
provide independent opinions on the following matters to the board of the directors or 
to the shareholders’ meeting: nomination, appointment, or replacement of directors; 
appointment or dismissal of senior managers; remuneration for directors and senior 
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managers; any existing or new loan borrowed from the listed company by or other 
fund transfer made by the company’s shareholders, actual controllers, or affiliated 
enterprises that exceeds 3,000,000 RMB or 5% of the company’s net assets audited 
recently, and whether the company has taken effective measures to collect the amount 
due; events that the independent director considers to be detrimental to the interests of 
minority shareholders; other matters stipulated by the articles of association. 
 
3.3.4 Board of supervisors 
According to Company Law, the board of supervisors exercises following powers: to 
check the financial affairs of the company; to supervise the duty-related acts of the 
directors and senior managers, to put forward proposals on the removal of any 
director or senior manager who violates any law, administrative regulation, the 
articles of association, or any resolution of the shareholders’ meeting; to demand any 
director or senior manager to make corrections if his or her act has injured the 
interests of the company; to propose to call interim shareholders’ meetings, to call and 
preside over shareholders’ meetings when the board of directors does not exercise the 
function of calling and presiding over shareholders’ meetings as prescribed by law; to 
put forward proposals at shareholders’ meetings; to initiate actions against directors or 
senior managers as specified; other duties as provided for by the articles of 
association. The board of supervisors shall include shareholders’ representatives and 
employee representatives of the company at a ratio of no less than one-third.  
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The board of supervisors plays an important role for supervision of authority. 
However, the board of supervisors in China is weak in internal function and exists in 
name only. It only performs duties by following procedures without any real 
supervisory function. In some companies, there is no board of supervisors or the 
position of supervisor is repeatedly set from board member. Even some supervisors 
and managers conspired to damage major shareholders’ interests. The imperfect 
corporate governance in China is partly due to lack of function by the board of 
supervisors.  
 
3.3.5 The CEO in China 
The appointment of and the power exercised by the CEO in Chinese-listed companies 
are different from that enjoyed by CEOs in foreign-listed companies. As indicated 
above, the CEO in China is responsible for the routine management, production, and 
operation activities of the company with certain decision-making right. The CEO’s 
decision-making power is discounted considerably under special circumstances in 
which major shareholders have absolute control rights. In China, the CEO thus mostly 
represents the rights of controlling shareholders to implement their decisions.  
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3.3.5.1 The CEO in SOEs 
For SOEs under the administration of the central government, the appointment of the 
CEO is very important. Some key industries are related to the safety of the national 
economy and even national defence, such as petroleum, chemical, 
telecommunications, and power. Therefore, CEOs in these types of companies are 
normally appointed by the central government. Candidates’ political awareness, 
morality, and work experience are first considerations. After the CEO has been 
selected, the board of directors shall carry out appointment procedures.  
 
For SOEs under the administration of local governments, the appointment of the 
general manager is normally effected by local governments. Normally, the CEO in 
these types of companies is decided by local governments in advance and then 
formally appointed by the board of directors. However, compared with CEOs in SOEs 
under the administration of the central government, they are more professional with 
relatively extensive decision-making rights. Especially in recent years, to promote the 
operation and management level of SOEs, local governments frequently organise 
external recruitment and select talent from the manager market, breaks the previous 
selection framework to some extent.  
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3.3.5.2 The CEO in non-SOEs 
Due to special family holdings or personal holdings, the controlling family or 
individual is inclined to appoint an obedient agent as the CEO. There are mainly two 
categories. 
 
In small and family business companies, major shareholders or chairman normally 
hold the CEO position at the same time. This makes the decision procedure more 
efficient but riskier. Bigger and highly marketised companies normally are aimed at 
corporate development, and they recruit talent in the manager market by providing 
competitive remuneration. The appointed CEO has certain decision-making power, 
but his or her rights are strictly supervised by the shareholders’ meeting and the board 
of directors, with individual decision-making restricted.  
 
3.3.6 CEO compensation in China 
In the United States and other developed countries, debate is growing concerning 
whether CEOs are overpaid. However, in China, the situation is different, with the 
issue concerning under-compensation of top management. Yang (1998) argues that 
the concern about management compensation focuses on the design of an appropriate 
system for compensation. The main part of the CEO compensation package in China 
is composed mainly of base salary. The very popular granted stock option seen in 
other countries is rare in China. Wei (1999) tries to find an explanation for this 
phenomenon, and he finally concludes the reason relies on government determining 
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the compensation system. Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006) state that many managers in 
China seek political status rather than economic rewards while they are in the 
positions. Moreover, top management compensation often depends on the relative 
earning of co-workers and local living standards for the sake of fairness. 
 
Before the 1970s, management compensation was not determined by either firm 
performance or individual contribution, but reflected other factors, such as region, 
industry, size, job title, occupation, and seniority of individual. The first step of 
China’s executive compensation reform began in the 1980s when a profit 
responsibility contract system was introduced. Managers were allowed to retain a 
portion of profit for themselves and other workers. Later, in 1985, compensation 
reform allowed the SOE’s wage budget to be linked to the firm’s economic 
performance and permitted the SOE to set its own internal wage. However, the wage 
budget needed to be approved in advance to avoid exceeding the governmental 
standard wage bill, and as managers still did not have right to hire and fire employees, 
this reform certainly lacked real incentive effects.  
 
A ‘yearly salary system’ was experimented with in 1992 and has been widely used 
since 1997. It is composed of a fixed component and variable component. The fixed 
salary is paid monthly and depends on the average wage of co-workers and the size of 
the firm. The variable salary is paid yearly and is linked to the economic performance 
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of the firm in the year. Recently, China’s policy makers appear to recognise the 
important of executive compensation as an effective incentive for top management.  
 
Zheng (1998) points out that SOEs lack a compensation system based on financial 
performance. He attributes this to the following. Firstly, there is a problem in the 
chain of the principal–agent relationship, because corporate control from the active 
market needs to go through various layers of bureaucracy. Secondly, the 
management’s input is not recognised in socialism; thus, no system awards 
managerial performance. Thirdly, managerial appointments in SOEs are decided by 
central or local government. Finally, information asymmetry leads to an inefficient 
incentive scheme for the state to motivate the managers of partially privatised SOEs.  
 
Firth et al. (2006) summarise the characteristics of management compensation in 
China, especially in SOEs. The government influence in setting policy and objective, 
and the dominance and influence of government officials in the management of firms 
have a great impact on the design of management compensation. Moreover, there is 
unseen upper limit for CEO compensation because of socialist characteristics of 
Chinese society. The firms attempt to be fair and moderate the wage difference 
between workers and executives. Huang and Zhang (1995) reveal that the salary of a 
CEO in SOEs is about three times that of an unskilled worker. Further, non-cash 
benefits, such as better housing, education allowance, and entertainment expenses are 
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very popular amongst CEOs and top management in China, perquisites that are 
difficult to measure. 
 
3.3.6.1 Research concerning CEO compensation in China 
Conyon and He (2008) estimate data from 1,481 firms in 2001-2005 and examine the 
relation between executive annual compensation and firm value using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression methods. Their total compensation uses the average of the 
top three management members as the proxy. Independent variables include sales, 
return on assets (ROA), total shareholder returns, firm risk, ownership concentration, 
size of boards, and CEO duality. These variables are all lagged by one period to 
mitigate any endogeneity concerns. They found that executive compensation is 
positively related to firm size, performance, and growth opportunity, and there is a 
negative relation to firm risk. Compensation is higher in firms that are privately 
owned and lower when the ownership is concentrated. Further, CEO compensation is 
positively related to the proportion of independent directors and unrelated to board 
size.  
 
Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006) examine data samples of all non-financial firms that have 
been listed on the stock exchanges of Shanghai and Shenzhen since 1998, which are 
obtained from company annual reports. In order to test the pay and performance they 
use two regression analyses: one is used to explain the level of pay and the other seeks 
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to explain changes in pay. They relate the level of pay to firm performance after 
controlling for firm size, industry, and geographical area. In order to see whether 
ownership has an impact on performance-related pay, they include main and 
interactive effects of the dominant shareholder. CEO compensation is the log pay of 
the CEO. Firm size is proxied by log of book value of the assets of the firm. Two 
performance measures are used here: return on sales and annual stock returns, the first 
of which is accounting-based and the other is market-based. Their main results show 
that firm size is positively and significantly associated with compensation levels. To 
further test pay–performance sensitivities in Chinese firms, they examine changes in 
CEO compensation. Their procedure is similar to that of Jensen and Murphy (1990), 
and they partition their results on the basis of ownership. Change in CEO pay is 
regressed on change in shareholder wealth, change in operating income, and change in 
size. The results of this regression indicate that accounting performance and firm size 
are important in explaining pay levels. 
 
Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007) apply a similar procedure and find a positive pay–
performance relation in China when performance is measured as ROAs. However, 
CEO compensation does not respond to stock returns. They also indicate that state 
ownership has a negative relation with compensation level, while foreign invested 
firms have a positive relation between firm value and compensation level. Further, 
foreign-invested firms show a higher pay for performance sensitivity. CEO 
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compensation is negatively related to the size of board of directors. Firms with many 
non-executive directors or without CEO/chairman duality are more likely to use 
performance-based pay.  
 
Li et al. (2007) analyse the importance of the corporate governance environment by 
testing the relationship between CEO compensation and board/shareholding 
characteristics. They estimate the data from all listed firms in the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2000-2001 with available CEO compensation data and a 
complete set of board and shareholding information. Three models are estimated. 
Model 1 restricts the set of explanatory variables to the firm’s board structure 
characteristics. In Model 2, the set of explanatory variables is related to the firm’s 
ownership structure. Model 3 jointly considers the firm’s board composition and 
ownership structure. All models include industry dummies and a time dummy to 
control for industry and time effects. Heteroskedasticity of residuals is addressed by 
using two robust regression methods. The first one is an OLS regression with robust 
errors based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent estimators. The other is 
an iteratively reweighted least squares (IRLS) regression, which, unlike OLS, assigns 
equal weight to all observations. IRLS regression involves an iterative procedure that 
assigns higher weights to well-behaved observations and lower weights to outliers. 
Their results show that there is no relation between CEO compensation and quality of 
corporate governance. In particular, they find that CEO compensation is uncorrelated 
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with CEO duality and board size. Further, they report a positive relation between 
CEO compensation and CEO ownership. Foreign-invested firms also have a positive 
effect on CEO compensation. 
 
Kato and Long (2006) estimate two standard measures of pay–performance relation 
for executives indicated in Murphy (1999) for Chinese-listed firm from 1998-2002. 
Total cash compensation including salary and bonus is proxied by the average of the 
top three executives. In the first model, executive compensation is regressed on the 
change in shareholder value of firm. Next, they estimate elasticity of pay with respect 
to shareholder value by regressing the change in the log of executive compensation on 
the change in the log of shareholder value of the firm. In order to test the robustness 
of the pay–performance relation, they also use other accounting-based variables, such 
as stock returns, sales growth, change in pre-tax income, and the presence of negative 
pre-tax income. Finally, they augment the standard CEO pay equation with a variable 
indicating the degree to which the firm is owned by the state and an interaction term 
involving, for example, a state ownership variable and firm performance. They find 
statistically significant sensitivities and elasticity of annual compensation for top 
executives with respect to shareholder value. This sensitivity is greater than that found 
in developed countries (Jensen and Murphy 1990, Murphy 1999). Further, they find 
that sales growth is significantly linked to executive compensation. Firms that are less 
state-controlled are more in line with those of the shareholders. 
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The results from Chinese scholars also show a mixed picture. Sun and Zhao (2006) 
measure the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance 
in China. They use random selection of 108 listed firms in China from 2000-2002 and 
apply linear regression techniques to analyse the relation between compensation and 
ROA and return on equity (ROE). They find a very small correlation between 
compensation and ROE, which means there is no linear correlation between ROE and 
CEO compensation. However, the correlation between ROA and compensation is 
very large, which indicates ROA and CEO compensation has a significant linear 
correlation. They conclude that CEO compensation levels should be supported by 
firm performance rather than returns of shareholders. 
 
Tao, Wei, and Li (2007) use cross-section data that selected 120 listed firms in China 
in 2006. Their regression results analyse the relationship between top executive 
compensation and firm size, ROA, ROE, and sales. Their results show that CEO 
compensation responses positively to firm performance and firm size. 
 
Zhang, Zhao, and Zhang (2003) also use cross-section data that included 127 listed 
Chinese firms in 2001, applying OLS and robustness tests. Executive compensation 
and firm size are used in log form. Their results show that there is a positive 
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relationship between both executive compensation and earnings per share (EPS), and 
compensation and firm size. 
 
Chen (2006) chooses all the A-listed firms as the research sample and aims to analyse 
the relation between CEO compensation and company performance. However, he 
only used ROE as the proxy for firm performance. The remainder of independent 
variables include the proportion of independent, the proportion of state ownership, 
CEO duality, and the size of the board of directors. His results show that there are 
positive relations between CEO compensation and ROE, and the size of the board of 
directors and CEO duality, while it is negative between CEO compensation and the 
proportion of state ownership. 
 
Li and Ni (2007) use ROE and CEO annual compensation in the financial statements 
of all listed firm from 2002-2003. They apply linear regression to check the CEO 
incentive plan in China. They find that the change of CEO compensation has a 
significant relation with firm performance in last year. However, CEO compensation 
only has very weak relation with the current year performance. 
 
Li (2000) and Wei (2000) analyse the management compensation with 748 listed 
Chinese firms in 1998 as the research sample. They show that there is no relation 
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between CEO compensation and firm performance (proxied by ROE). However, CEO 
compensations respond significantly to firm size.  
 
Li and Xia (2006) use all Chinese firms listed in the technology sector from 2001-
2003 to test the relation between senior management compensation and firm 
performance. Senior management includes all the members in the board of directors 
and board of supervisors. The modelling method is the stepwise linear regression. The 
firm performance is composed of four variables: ROA, sales, EPS, and net asset per 
share. In addition, they also use log form of total assets as the control variables. Their 
results show that there is no significantly positive relation between annual 
compensation of senior management and firm performance. 
 
3.4 External Governance Mechanism in Listed Companies of 
China 
The external governance mechanism indicates that governments, creditors, employees 
(workers), suppliers, consumers, and related stakeholders supervise and 
counterbalance corporate operators. External governance is effectively supplementary 
to internal governance. As the socialist market economy system is gradually improved, 
external governance factors, such as laws and regulations, restraints by administrative 
and supervisory departments, the manager market, and so forth continue to play an 
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important role. In particular, restraints by administrative authorities surpass even 
supervisory restraints by internal governance.  
 
3.4.1 Legal restrictions on listed companies of China 
Firstly, listed companies must comply with all laws and regulations. These laws 
include not only those applicable to listed companies, but also those applicable to all 
companies. Currently, they include but are not limited to the following: Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises (effective 1 
May 2009), Real Right Law of the People’s Republic of China (effective 1 October 
2007), Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (revised 28 October 2005), 
Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (revised 28 October 2005), Some 
Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, Opening, and Steady Growth 
of Capital Markets (31 January 2004), Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Commercial Banks (27 December 2003), Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
the People’s Bank of China (revised 27 December 2003), General Principles of the 
Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, Trust Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, Guaranty Law of the People’s Republic of China, Criminal Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Negotiable Instruments, Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Commercial Banks, and Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on Foreign-funded Enterprises. Amongst Company Law of the People’s Republic of 
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China and Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China are basic principles for 
listed companies. 
 
Secondly, listed companies must accord with administrative regulations issued by the 
government, local regulations, department rules, and other rules stipulated by 
supervisory bodies, including but not limited to Regulations on the Shareholders’ 
Meeting of Listed Companies (2006), Guidance on the Articles of Association of 
Listed Companies (2006), Guidance on Training for Senior Managers of Listed 
Companies (2005), Opinions on Improving the Quality of Listed Companies (2005), 
Guiding Opinion on Establishment of Independent Director Systems by Listed 
Companies (2001), and Governance Rules for Listed Companies (2002).  
 
According to the practices in China, laws and regulations for listed companies have 
been improved in recent years, and these laws, regulations, and rules have a growing 
influence on listed companies. Many listed companies have received punishments and 
penalties for violations, which functions as a warning to some extent.  
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3.4.2 Restrictions on listed companies of China by administrative 
authorities 
China is at the transition period from the planned economy system to the socialist 
market economy system. It is characterised by legal improvements, existing 
government administration, and remaining administrative restraints.  
 
Firstly, listed companies must receive supervision by the CSRC, which is the 
authority administering all securities markets throughout the nation. The CSRC 
performs administrative functions upon authorisation from the State Council and 
conducts centralised and unified regulatory efforts on the securities industry based on 
laws and regulations. Its functions include but are not limited to the following: to 
formulate regulations and detailed implementation rules on the supervision of listed 
companies; to urge listed companies to complete corporate governance structures; to 
supervise the merger and combination activities of domestic-listed companies; to 
supervise and guide exchange stock and send organisations to supervise information 
disclosure of listed companies; to supervise listed companies and their directors, 
supervisors, senior managers, and major shareholders in abiding by the provisions of 
the securities laws; to assist related authorities in supervising stock issuance, 
convertible bonds issuance and foreign spinoff listings of listed companies; to 
coordinate with related authorities to deal with delisting of listed companies and 
significant risk incidents. The CSRC has the absolute right of supervision over listed 
companies as an important part for external supervision. It takes many effective 
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measures to promote the corporate governance of listed companies and improve 
standardised operations. It requires that companies be listed to construct a perfect 
governance mechanism. After listing, companies shall receive an annual audit and the 
CSRC must monitor changes on the governance structure.  
 
Secondly, listed companies must receive supervision by industry administrations. For 
example, China Banking Regulatory Commission CBRC supervises all listed 
commercial banks and listed financial assets management companies; China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission CIRC supervises all listed insurance companies 
and their branches. Almost every listed company is under the supervision of its own 
industry administration.  
 
Thirdly, listed companies must receive supervision from the government 
administration. In the Chinese securities market, listed companies of a large scale are 
normally state-owned companies. Any governance problem in these companies not 
only affects the image of the companies, but also influences the reputation of related 
authorities and even governments. Therefore, governments carry out strict 
management on listed companies in different ways.  
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3.4.3 Restrictions on listed companies by the managerial labour market 
As the securities markets develop and many Chinese companies are listed in domestic 
or overseas securities markets, the manager market, based on listed companies, 
matures and develops with significant influence on the governance of listed 
companies by managers. If a listed company demonstrates poor operation, negative 
performance, or violation of reporting finance rules, its managers may lose their own 
value in the market with lifelong effects. Thus, such restraints or concerns over 
reputation cause managers to moderate their own behaviours and make efforts to 
improve the operating performance of listed companies. To promote corporate 
performance, they must fulfil their duties inside and avoid abusing privileges. 
Towards this end, general managers of listed companies will endeavour to perfect 
internal corporate governance, enhance system construction, strengthen external 
information disclosure by listed companies, and improve the efficiency of decisions. 
The development of the manager market and the phenomenon of manager recruitment 
in the manager market by many listed companies boosts and improves the corporate 
governance structure of listed companies.  
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III. Hypotheses 
In this section, I discuss factors that can affect CEO compensation. These include 
performance, firm size, ownership type, ownership concentration, size of the board of 
directors, independent directs, CEO–chairman duality and size of the board of 
supervisors Then, I offer ten hypotheses related to each factor. 
 
1. Performance 
Performance has been used as an important part to determine CEO compensation in 
most countries. According to the principal–agent theory, all shareholders of listed 
companies have the ownership and rights of surplus value. Although CEOs have the 
right to control and manage company’s operation, they cannot share extra profits 
arising from their efforts in operation. Moreover, despite a lack of surplus value 
claims, they must take responsibility for the consequences from their operation. Under 
a different allocation of risks and profits, the CEO would prefer to select relatively 
safe investment projects with low risks. Such selection results enable CEOs to ensure 
relatively stable profits from stable corporate performance. However, concerning the 
corporate benefits and shareholders’ interest, companies may lose development 
opportunities. The long-term interests of both companies and shareholders may suffer 
damaged due to imprudent selection. Therefore, listed companies always try to link 
shareholders’ and CEOs’ interests by designing a compensation system that is 
normally subject to corporate performance. Shareholders will decide CEO 
compensation based on observable performance to motivate their agents to contribute 
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and avoid selfish behaviours. This could result in a CEO receiving higher pay when 
corporate performance is good and lower pay when the corporate performance fails to 
meet annual goals of either company or shareholders. 
 
Previous literature has documented considerable analysis of the relationship between 
firm performance and executive compensation. Most has been directed at the CEO 
level, under the assumption that executive compensation can be used to align the 
interests of CEOs with shareholders.  
 
Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998) summarise the research on the relation between 
top management compensation and firm performance, documenting more than 300 
studies in the last 70 years. They point out that even with different data samples, 
measurement of CEO compensation and firm performance, statistical techniques, and 
model specification, most research has found weak or even statistically insignificant 
relationships between pay and performance.  
 
In early research, Murphy (1985) measures shareholder return and sales growth and 
find that executive compensation is statistically associated with firm performance. 
Veliyath and Bishop (1995) provide a positive correlation between shareholder stock 
returns and CEO cash compensation with a cross-section data sample. In addition, 
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Conyon et al. (2001) find a positive relationship between executive pay and firm 
performance.  
 
However, Barro and Barro (1990), Garen (1994), and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) 
find no significant evidence to show the relationship between pay and performance. 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) empirically estimate the relationship between firm 
performance and CEO pay, which included salary, bonus, stock option, stock 
appreciation, and dismiss. It shows that CEO compensation has a weak correlation 
with shareholder wealth or company value. Tosi et al. (2000) find the weak link 
between CEO pay and company performance in which less than 5% of CEO pay can 
be explained by the performance factor. For markets other than the United States, 
Mengistae and Xu (2004) examine the extent to which agency theory may explain 
CEO compensation in Chinese SOEs during the 1980s. They find a weak or even 
negative relation between CEO compensation and SOE performance in their 10-year 
sample. Merhebi et al. (2006) determine that CEO compensation research in Australia 
has found a negative pay–performance relation or none at all.  
 
Subsequently, considerable research has been applied to try to find the reason for the 
weak relationship. Yermack (1995) provides empirical evidence that with the high 
‘noise’ of earnings, managerial performance is difficult to assess. Bebchuk and Fried 
(2003) point out such performance cannot determine the industry performance and 
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economy situation. When certain industries boom, even an inefficient manager could 
receive a high profit from his options awards.  
 
The results of research on the relationship between CEO compensation and company 
performance in China are mixed. Firth et al. (2006) tested the relationship between 
compensation and firm performance in 549 Chinese-listed companies from 1998-2000. 
They find positive relations between CEO pay and firm performance measured in 
both accounting terms and shareholder wealth terms. Kato and Long (2006) also 
report a positive relationship between CEO cash compensation and company 
performance. More recently, Conyon and He (2011) find executive pay is positively 
correlated to firm performance, using both shareholder returns and ROA to proxy 
performance and average pay of top executives from 2000-2005 to proxy CEO 
compensation. In the Chinese literature, Song and Zhang (2002), Zhang, Zhao, and 
Zhang (2003), Gao and Song (2007), and Sun and Zhao (2006) show a positive 
relationship between CEO compensation and various types of performance. In 
contrast, other researchers report no relationship between CEO pay and company 
performance in China (Li, 2000; Wei, 2000, and Hu, 2003). Most scholars also show 
a positive pay–performance sensitivity in Chinese-listed companies (Firth et al., 2006; 
Firth et al., 2007; Kato and Long 2006; Conyon and He, 2011). 
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Whether there is a significant relationship between CEO compensation and company 
performance in Chinese-listed firms, especially SOEs, is an empirical question. The 
current form of executive compensation in most SOEs in China is the yearly salary 
system, in line with the Chinese government expectation that listed SOEs will adopt 
more efficient and Western-style corporate governance with a strong pay–
performance link for top executives. Accordingly, I offer the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between CEO compensation and 
firm performance in China’s listed firms. 
 
There are two primary measures of a firm’s economic performance, namely, 
accounting-based and market-based measurements. The most common proxy of each 
measurement is ROA and EPS. Both measures are used, because each has strengths 
and weaknesses in evaluating firm performance. Seth (1990) points out that the 
difference between market-based and accounting-based measurements is that the 
former reflects the present value of future streams of income and the latter 
concentrates on past performance. He argues that the market measures for financial 
performance are proper, because they reflect ‘the consensus of the market’s overall 
estimate of the firm’s potential to create shareholder value’ in the current and future 
period. On the other hand, Lambert (1993) and Sloan (1993) confirm the superiority 
of accounting-based measure of company performance. They provide evidence that 
accounting income has a less noisy signal related to CEO effort than do stock returns. 
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The data available to me enable a consideration of total cash compensation, which 
includes salary and bonus, while other forms of compensation, especially stock-
related compensation, are not well-used in China. Very few firms have executive 
stock options; further, they offer limited disclosure. The limited information offered 
on stock options made it difficult to value these grants. Some firms disclosed they that 
pay an executive bonus dependent on stock returns without formula. One major 
explanation of the limited use of stock option points to CEO in most large 
government-controlled SOEs being are appointed by the central government. This 
means their political role is more important than their management role. Another 
explanation is that the long-term nature of stock options may be unattractive to both 
CEO and top management in China. 
 
2. Firm size 
The relationship between CEO compensation and firm size is another very consistent 
empirical result in the compensation literature. Researchers are interested in the firm 
size–executive pay relation for several reasons. Firstly, executive pay is tied to firm 
size, because it is considered a symbol of power and prestige for executives, which is 
easily recognised. Secondly, CEOs can exercise more influence over firm size than 
performance and therefore use firm size as a criterion for compensation (Kroll et al., 
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1990). Previous research indicated that firm size could affect the pay–performance 
relationship (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). Higher levels 
of compensation are expected to be paid to executives in larger firms (Gaver and 
Gaver, 1995), because the larger the operational scope, the greater the demands on top 
executives. Executives in larger firms may be much wealthier and less risk-averse, 
compared with their counterparts in small firms and thus able to accept higher 
compensation. Moreover, since it is believed that executives who manage larger and 
more complex firms bring greater knowledge and ability than do executives of smaller 
and less complex firms, they merit a higher level of compensation on the external 
labour market (Becker, 1964; Rosen, 1982). 
 
Murphy (1985) argues that large firms tend to pay their CEOs more. Large and low-
performance firms may employ highly paid CEOs, while smaller and high-growth 
firms employ relatively lower-paid CEOs. The omission of a measure of firm size 
could induce a bias in the estimate of the pay–performance sensitivity of these firms. 
Rosen (1992) has done a wide review of empirical findings on executive 
compensation. He argues that CEOs operating larger firms should earn higher 
compensation because of their higher marginal productivity.  
 
Recent studies are consistent with past results and confirm the relation between firm 
size and CEO compensation. Core et al. (1999) bring up that firm size is a proxy for 
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surveying executive compensation and complexity associated with firm sales. Baker 
and Hall (2004) also indicate that there is a positive correlation between CEO pay and 
firm size.  
 
Firm size is not exogenous to CEO compensation but in this relationship, these 
influence each other. If a CEO has an incentive to expand the firm size by different 
methods (acquisition of assets, repurchase, investment, and so forth), then the pay is 
expected to increase in subsequent periods. In China, large SOEs are politically more 
important in a socialist economy. Government should have a greater incentive to 
protect and assist large firms, due to businesses’ relationship to society. Hence, I 
propose a positive relationship between CEO compensation and firm size in China’s 
listed firms that is consistent with the literature: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between CEO compensation and 
firm size in China’s listed firms. 
 
3. Ownership type 
The unique ownership structure is a key feature of Chinese-listed firms. Most listed 
companies in China are SOE or transferred from SOE. Different SOEs also belong to 
different groups. The concept of ultimate ownership was first introduced by La Porta 
et al. in 1999. Since then, the tracing of the ultimate controller concept has become 
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more valuable on an international basis when research was correlated to ownership. 
As more listed companies became commonplace in China, the CSRC required them to 
adopt modern corporate governance systems with a strong pay–performance 
relationship. CEO compensation package should be based on company performance. 
However, listed companies, especially SOEs, normally get some degree of effect from 
controlling shareholder or acting as the ultimate controller when setting CEO 
compensation. SOEs cannot eliminate governmental administrative interference when 
dealing with the CEO pay level. Using the ultimate ownership conception from La 
Porta et al. (1999), I classified all Chinese A-share listed company into five groups. 1) 
SAMB-SOEs administered by SASAC under the State Council; 2) SOELG-SOEs 
administered by other central government ministries; 3) LAMB-SOEs administered 
by local state assets management bureaus; 4) SOEs administered by the local 
government; and 5) OTHERS, non-SOE companies that include private firms, 
individuals, educational institutions, or collective ownership.  
 
Chen et al. (2009) investigated the relationship between ownership and company 
performance. They found that privately listed firms in China are not necessarily 
superior to certain types of SOEs. In considering the objective and policy of 
companies, I have redeveloped the classification of Chinese-listed companies as 
above to reflect the following: Non-SOE companies usually are more marketised than 
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are SOEs. Most companies in this group are privately listed companies with higher 
CEO compensation levels and a strong pay–performance link.  
 
SAMB-controlled companies usually have a huge quantity and scale of corporate 
assets as well as a large number of employees. Companies under this group are the 
first group of SOEs transferred into listed companies. To some extent, the central 
government gives priority and preferential policy to these SOEs. These companies 
practiced modern corporate governance at the first stage of reform. Performance-
related CEO compensation was introduced in corporate management along with 
reform. They also encourage hiring more professionals and talent at the board and 
management levels to promote more efficient operation. CEO compensation in this 
group should better than other SOEs but lower than that of private companies. In 
addition, the degree of CEO compensation marketisation is relatively high. 
 
SOELG-controlled companies are distributed across financial industries and 
monopoly industries. The central government imposes very high restrictions and 
regulations on this group of companies. The CEO compensation level in this group is 
relatively high, compared with other SOEs. Changes in CEO pay cannot depend 
solely on company performance. The marketisation degree of CEO compensation is 
relatively low. 
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LAMB-controlled companies are similar to SAMB-controlled companies but not 
identical. Compensation levels and company size in this group are much lower and 
smaller than are those of SAMBs. LAMB-controlled companies also practice modern 
corporate governance systems. Companies put together professional management 
teams from either the manager market or overseas markets. The CEO compensation 
level should be lower than SAMB- and OTHER-controlled companies should but 
better than other SOEs. 
 
SOGLG-controlled companies are influenced by local government. CEO nomination 
and the setting of CEO compensation is usually influenced by local government to 
some extent. The CEO compensation level and the pay–performance link are 
relatively low and weak. 
 
OTHERS-controlled companies are more focussed on economic benefit and earnings. 
Government holds less sway over board operations. The setting of CEO compensation 
is similar to the ways of Western countries with performance-based incentives. CEO 
compensation level in this group should be highest, compared with other groups.  
 
In considering these types of special ownership in China, I offer the following five 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3.1: CEO compensation is lower when the company is controlled by 
the state. 
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Hypothesis 3.2: CEO compensation in OTHERS-controlled companies is higher 
than in SAMB-controlled companies. 
Hypothesis 3.3: CEO compensation in OTHERS-controlled companies is higher 
than in SOECG-controlled companies. 
Hypothesis 3.4: CEO compensation in OTHERS-controlled companies is higher 
than in LAMB-controlled companies. 
Hypothesis 3.5: CEO compensation in OTHERS-controlled companies is higher 
than in SOELG-controlled companies. 
 
4. Ownership concentration 
Previous literature has addressed that if there are many small shareholders – thus a 
dispersed ownership – the manager will hold more power. They could take this 
change to award themselves higher pay. Minority shareholders do not have enough 
power or the incentive to monitor the manager. However, ownership concentration 
can partly serve to align the conflict of interests between controlling and minority 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997; Mitton 2002; Lins, 2003). Lee and 
O’Neill (2003) note that concentrated ownership can increase the incentives for large 
shareholders to obtain and disclose more detailed information. As a result, minority 
shareholders benefit from the information environment created by large controlling 
shareholders. Further, communication between major shareholders and top managers 
can reduce information asymmetry. Thus, concentrated ownership can make top 
managers take a longer view of the firm’s long-term development based on more 
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communication and efficient monitoring. Santerre and Neun (1986) apply the 
Herfindahl index as the degree of stock dispersion and find a negative relation 
between degree of holder control and executive compensation. Holderness (2003) 
points out that many larger-percentage shareholders are top managers or directors in 
some public corporations. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) investigate the manager as 
blockholder: will he pay himself more, compared with similar size but more diffuse 
firms? They conclude that the majority do receive larger salaries, but the extra amount 
is small, compared with the average investment necessary to achieve majority 
ownership. On the other hand, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) and Mehran (1995) 
confirm the role of outside blockholders in monitoring the compensation of top 
executives.  
 
The relation between ownership concentration and performance should be positive 
from the point of view of shareholder–management agency conflict. As the share size 
increases, the monitoring effect from the large shareholders increase, but the relevant 
cost does not grow greater. Moreover, blockholders are assumed to be better informed 
than are average investors. Thus, they are more capable in controlling managers. 
Better information could also lead to higher insights into the company, which can 
reduce monitoring costs. Hence, blockholders have both the motivation and capability 
to control management. 
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On the other hand, as introduced by Burkart et al. (1997), private benefits of control 
suggest a negative relation between ownership concentration and firm performance. 
Large shareholders are better informed and have more control rights than minority 
shareholders. They might use these advantages to exploit their own interests, rather 
than the interests of all shareholders. Barclay et al. (1993) and Zingales (1994) offer 
empirical support for this theory. Zingales (1994) points out private action can consist 
of self-trading or insider contracts. Moreover, blockholder and minority shareholders 
may have different investment time horizons and goals. Minority shareholders can do 
nothing to prevent such actions against their interests. As blockholders gain more 
control over influencing company decisions, the possibility of successfully executing 
actions injurious to minority shareholders arises. 
 
In my study, I define large shareholders as holders of blocks of 5% or more of a listed 
company’s share, which is classified by previous literature. Chinese-listed firms are 
required to disclose in annual reports the names of holders of blocks of shares of 5% 
or more, or at least the top 10 shareholders and the percentage of their ownership, thus 
making the data available. Since most listed firms in China usually have concentrate 
ownership and particularly the state is often the largest shareholder, it is believed that 
managers in Chinese-listed firm have less managerial power and tend to not pay 
excessive compensation to themselves. I offer the following hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relation between CEO compensation and the 
concentration of ownership in China’s listed firms. 
 
Board of directors 
5. Independent directors 
The primary board-related issue is board composition. Board composition 
characteristics include three main types of directors: inside directors, outside directors, 
and affiliated individuals. Inside directors are always full-time management 
employees and can be executive officers, chairman, or financial officers. Byrd and 
Hickman (1992) consider that inside directors provide valuable information about a 
firm’s activities. Baysinger and Butler (1985) claim that outside directors are 
independent and fulfil the role of directors in the corporate control view of firm. To be 
truly independent, outside directors must not be currently working in the firm or have 
any strong psychological or economic relationship with its CEO. In addition, they 
define the affiliated directors, who are not full-time employees of the firm but have a 
relation with it to some extent. Affiliated directors can be investment bankers, 
commercial bankers, lawyers, consultants, suppliers, and so forth. Both outside 
directors and affiliated directors are independent directors. 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that both outside and inside directors are valuable to 
the company. Insiders can provide experience and expertise that offers support to the 
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firm’s operation while more exposed to potential self-dealing problem. In contrast, 
outsiders can be additional monitoring devices, adding their experience and value to 
the company. Fama and Jensen (1983) claim that an effective board should be 
composed of a large fraction of outside independent directors who hold significant 
positions in other company. Fama (1980) claims that outside directors are an essential 
part of the board because of the potential for collusion amongst inside directors. 
Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles (1987) state outside directors have a greater incentive to 
oversee the manager’s actions than inside directors do. They are more likely to 
dismiss top management. The reason may rely on the personal liability for corporate 
actions, that is, they care about and wish to preserve their reputation on the human 
resource market. 
 
Although the corporate governance literature makes the case that the proportion of 
independent directors will be negatively associated with top executive pay, empirical 
evidence has been mixed (e.g., Boyd, 1994; Kren and Kerr, 1997) with some studies 
reporting significant positive relationships (Lambert et al., 1993; Firth et al., 1999). In 
addition, Thian (2005) concludes that in China, independent directors are usually 
lacking knowledge and experience, so they always cannot direct management 
decisions. A rationale for the positive relationship is that independent directors may 
quote the high pay for the CEO as a comparison benchmark when they renegotiate 
their compensation at the firms for which they work. Another reason is the larger the 
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companies and boards, the larger numbers of independent directors needed. CEO 
compensation will be affected by company size, as I discussed above.  
 
In China, Tenev and Zhang (2002) indicate that possible measures to strengthen the 
independence of the board of directors can focus on increasing the number of external 
and independent directors. According to CSRC 2001, rules on establishing an 
independent board of directors in listed companies require that at least one-third of the 
board consist of independent directors and include at least one accounting 
professional. This rule provides minimum seats of independent directors and ensures 
board independence. However, both Chen (2006) and Firth et al. (2007) found no 
relationship between proportion of independent directors and CEO compensation. 
More recently, both Li et al. (2007) and Conyon and He (2008) reported a positive 
relationship between them. These results implicate that the function of independent 
directors in Chinese list firm do not present well. The ineffective monitoring of in 
dependent director brings CEOs higher compensation. 
Considering the quality and quantity of independent directors in China, I offer the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5.1: There is a positive relationship between CEO compensation and 
the proportion of the independent directors included on the board in China’s 
listed firms. 
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In addition, the space out of which independent directors’ work can affect CEO 
compensation. Firstly, they have enough time and space to monitor the CEO’s activity 
if independent directors working place and company headquarters are in same 
province. Secondly, they are familiar with the level of living expenses and average 
wage costs in that area. Thus, they will not quote a higher pay to a CEO that goes over 
local compensation benchmarks. Wang (2004) points out that the Chinese working 
income gap has expanded to some extent in recent years, and the most outstanding 
phenomenon is the enlargement of a working income gap in different areas. By 
looking at the whole country, the working income gap increased between the eastern 
and western areas constantly. The income level of each area is different, depending on 
living standards and development degree. Independent directors and company are not 
in same province willing to quote a higher pay if they are not familiar with company 
local living expenses. The reason for this phenomenon is they can also receive a 
higher pay or other benefits from CEO. Thus, I offer the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5.2: CEO compensation is higher when independent directors and 
company headquarters are in different provinces. 
 
6. Board size 
Board size also contributes to board effectiveness and efficiency. Jensen (1993) 
believes that corporate boards become less effective as they grow in size, which is 
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based on the premise that larger boards likely are slower to react. If the size of the 
board is too large, for example, more than twenty people, they are less likely to 
function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control. This could be cause by 
animosity and retribution from the CEO. Yet Lipton and Lorsch (1992) show that if 
the size of the board increases, its capacity for monitoring increases as well. However, 
the benefit of monitoring cannot compensate for the cost of extra directors. Dey (2008) 
confirms that smaller board sizes can be more effective as monitors as well. Small 
boards have fewer disagreements amongst their members, who operate more 
efficiently and are better organised in exerting board functions than their peers on 
larger boards. Yermack (1996) finds an inverse association amongst the firm’s market 
value and the size of the board of directors, which was measured with Tobin’s Q. 
Further, he notes that small boards are more likely to dismiss the CEO following 
periods of poor performance and that CEO compensation is more sensitive to 
performance in small firms. In addition, according to a stock return analysis done by 
Yermack, when the board shrinks, stock returns react positively. This implies that 
investors see small boards as better governance structures, since larger boards are less 
effective and more susceptible to CEO influence. In order to decrease the 
disadvantages from a larger board, Shareholders prefer either reduce board size or 
increase board independence. The inefficient board monitoring caused by larger and 
complex board also exists in China.  Hence, I offer the following:  
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive relationship between CEO compensation and 
the size of the board of directors in China’s listed firms. 
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7. CEO and chairman duality 
CEO duality exists when a firm’s CEO also assumes the role of board chair of the 
directors. Prior studies suggest that a dual CEO/chair would have a higher agency 
problem, since the CEO is more likely to be entrenched (Yermack, 1996; Core et al., 
1999). CEO entrenchment occurs when CEOs gain enough power to use the firm to 
pursue their own interests rather than that of shareholders. Mallette and Fowler (1992) 
point out that the CEO entrenchment is positively related to the CEO’s tenure with a 
company. This is because a CEO can influence the board of directors though the 
director nomination process over time. Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) point out that 
duality leads to CEO entrenchment by challenging a board’s ability to monitor and 
discipline. A number of researchers suggest agency problems worsen when the CEO 
is also the board chair, because this violates the separation of decision management 
and decision control. Separating decision management and decision control could 
help to alleviate agency problems by limiting managerial power to take advantage of 
shareholders, thus damaging their interest. This in turn damages a board’s ability to 
monitor CEO’s decisions, which gives CEOs greater opportunities to explore personal 
interests against those of the firm’s shareholders. Iyengar and Zampelli (2009) argue 
from the perspective of agency theory: CEOs maximise their own utility and minimise 
individuals’ risk at shareholders’ expense. On the other hand, the independent board 
functions to monitor CEOs’ decisions, ensuring they act in shareholders’ best interests. 
When the CEO chairs the board of directors, the separation of decision management 
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and decision control is breached, with the board less able to monitor the CEO. In this 
case, a CEO may make decisions of personal benefit at the expense of shareholder 
wealth, which in turn negatively affects a firm’s performance. Jensen (1993) argues 
that when the CEO also holds the position of board chair, internal control systems fail, 
as the board cannot effectively perform its key control functions. Ryan and Wiggins 
(2001) argue that CEO/chairman duality gives the CEO more power to affect the 
board, which weakens board control over the firm’s compensation policy.  
 
Agency theory suggests that CEO duality reduces the monitoring ability of the board 
and thus entrenches the CEO. On the other hand, organisational theorists argue that 
combining CEO and chairman positions is important, because it creates a unified 
leadership for the firm. Agency theory would suggest that the chairman be an 
independent outside director in order to serve most effectively as a direct monitor of 
the CEO. CEO duality promotes entrenchment and can lead to opportunistic 
behaviour. The empirical evidence on CEO duality is mixed. Core et al. (1999) and 
Brickley et al. (1997) report that duality leads to higher CEO pay in the United States. 
Xu (2003) finds that companies with state shareholders are more likely to have CEO 
duality. Hence, I offer the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7: CEO compensation is higher when the CEO played the chairman 
role simultaneously in China’s listed firms. 
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Board of supervisors 
8. Size of the board of supervisors 
Another important component of the Chinese corporation is the board of supervisors. 
The main function of the board of supervisors is to monitor management and 
supervise directors, managers, and other top management. 
 
From the international point of view, the board of supervisors can be divided into two 
major types, namely, the German model and Japanese model. 
                         German Two-Tier System 
 
 
 
Executive Board 
Supervisory Board 
Shareholder Meeting 
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Japanese System 
 
Germany’s corporate governance is taken up by the two-tier system. A management 
board and a supervisory board are established under the shareholder meeting and the 
supervisory board is upon the management board. German company law gives the 
supervisory board greater powers; these include appointing and dismissing members 
of the management board, setting up directors’ compensation plans, monitoring the 
executive director to determine whether to operate the company according to the 
articles of association, and so forth. In contrast, the responsibility and the function of 
the board of supervisors in Japan are of a purely monitoring nature. Their position is 
equal to that of the board of directors. While, they will perform a supervisory role by 
simply saying that it will, without actually giving the board any significant powers. 
The board of supervisors in China is similar to the Japanese model. Under Chinese 
Company Law, the listed companies give both the board of directors and the board of 
Shareholder 
Meeting 
Board of 
Directors 
Board of 
Supervisors 
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supervisors an equal say. The law stipulates that the supervisory board be composed 
of no less than three members whose term of office is three years. The supervisory 
board should be composed of shareholders’ representatives and a proper proportion of 
representatives for employees. However, the Company Law does not address the exact 
proportion in the board of supervisors; it only requires that the corporate charts 
properly stipulate the proportion. The supervisor may not be the same person as any 
director or manager or chief financial officer. Supervisors shall attend meetings of the 
board of directors as non-voting participants. Further, the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies in China issued by the CSRC and the State 
Economic and Trade Commission (2001) requires that supervisors should have related 
knowledge or work experience concerning accounting and law.  
 
Li et al. (2007) point out that in the governance structure of Chinese-listed firms, the 
board of supervisors functions as an additional control layer that aims to monitor the 
behaviour of the CEO and board directors. Members of the supervisory board usually 
hold shares and consist of shareholders and workers’ representatives. Since they are 
delegates for workers’ interests, high CEO compensation could be viewed as 
damaging. In Germany where they have reserved seats on the board, workers’ 
representatives naturally tend to vote against excess CEO compensation. Sheng (2004) 
notes that the Chinese supervisory system does not work well due to the following 
factors. Firstly, qualifying and electing supervisors is problematic to some extent. 
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They usually have lower educational knowledge and related working experience than 
directors and managers. Secondly, adequate power of the supervisory board is absent. 
Directors and managers do not need to report regularly to the board of supervisors. 
Thirdly, supervisors lack the necessary incentive and disciplinary mechanisms. 
Supervisors are not involved in the selection of directors and managers. 
 
Dahya et al. (2002) argue that a board of supervisors does not always have adequate 
information and resources to perform its own duties. Tenev and Zhang (2002) point 
out that supervisors overall have less business and working experience than do 
directors. They also criticise that supervisors generally meet less frequently than the 
board of directors, and the meeting is not well attended. Supervisors often agree with 
decisions made by the board of directors and top management rather than contest 
them. Thus, this type of comparatively low quality, less professional supervisor 
results in their inability to act in supervisory roles for directors and managers. 
 
If the size of the board of supervisors is large, it will offer more opinions from 
workers and minority shareholders, which leads to lower CEO compensation levels. 
Increasing supervisory board size will also increase monitoring quality and lead to the 
reduction of CEO compensation. The average number of supervisors in Chinese-listed 
companies is around three and only one person is a worker representative. This 
situation potentially makes boards of supervisors in China ineffective. Giving more 
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position and power to boards of supervisors, especially workers’ representatives, will 
increase the quality of monitoring and lead to better corporate governance. 
According to Li et al. (2007) and Buck et al. (2008) with no significant relationship 
between size of the board of supervisors and CEO compensation, I offer the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 8: There is no relationship between CEO compensation and the size 
of the board of supervisors in China’s listed firms. 
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IV. Variables, Data, and Methodology 
In this section, I discuss both independent and dependent variables, and the 
methodology used to test the relationship between them. The main research question 
is to test the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. However, 
past literature has used a considerable number of different variables to proxy both 
performance and compensation. The dependent variable in this study is CEO 
compensation, which is defined as the CEO total cash compensation, including base 
salary, bonuses, and commission. The independent variables consists of company 
performance, company operating characteristic, shareholding characteristic, board 
characteristic, CEO personal characteristic, and other factors. First, I will discuss the 
available dataset and principles that underscored its choice. The procedures for 
measuring both dependent and independent variables are discussed afterwards.  
 
1. Variables 
CEO Compensation (CEOPAY) 
The total CEO pay package usually consists of salary, short-term incentive award, 
long-term incentive, benefits, and other elements. Salary is the basic form of CEO 
compensation and is also a general way of payment adopted by many companies. 
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The basic salary is set by the general industry level adjusted by company size, which 
is a best proxy for managerial skill requirement, job complexity, and span control. 
Bonus is another component of short-term compensation, which can be in the form of 
increasing salary or the form of direct cash received. The CEO’s amount of bonus 
usually has a relation with objective performances of the company. However, it 
cannot incentivise long-term behaviour of the executive. The bonus payment as an 
incentive may raise problems, because the bonus is usually paid on the base of the 
firm performance of the current fiscal year. Thus, it is necessary to include the long-
term incentive in the compensation package. Granted stock and stock option are two 
kinds of long-range incentives to associate CEO interest with company performance, 
because the stock values relate directly to their own interests. Stock options are 
contracts that give the recipient the right to buy a share of stock at a pre-specified 
exercise price for a pre-specified term. They not only help to attract and retain 
excellent manager but also conserve cash flow during financial constraints. However, 
compensation in the form of stock options is not commonly used in China. Until 2010, 
only 167 companies have stock-related pay out of total number of 2,062 companies 
listed in A-shares in China. 
 
In previous literature, we observe several measures of executive compensation, such 
as total executive pay and average executive pay. Total executive pay is defined as the 
total annual cash compensation for all directors, supervisors, and high-level 
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executives. Average executive pay is calculated by total executive pay divided by the 
number of all directors, supervisors, and high-level executives. The most often used 
metric in Chinese data is the top three executive’s average pay, which includes total 
annual cash compensation for CEO and the two other highest-paid executives. Instead, 
in this study, I use CEO real individual annual total compensation as the proxy of 
CEO pay. The data allow us to consider total cash compensation (including salary and 
bonus) rather than the whole compensation package with equity ownership and stock 
option. That is because data on other forms of compensation (e.g. equity ownership or 
stock option) are available for only a small number of companies, which is different 
from other international studies on executive compensation outside the United States. 
 
Since 1998, the CSRC required all listed Chinese companies to disclose the total 
amount of compensation for the board of directors, the supervisory board, and senior 
management. However, it changed policy in 1999 and required disclosure of the total 
amount of compensation only for all directors and managers. In 2001, the CSRC 
changed the regulation of annual reporting again, stipulating that the sum of the top 
three executives and the sum of the top three directors must be disclosed in the 
company’s annual report. To the best of my knowledge, most past research related to 
pay–performance relationship in China has used the top three executives’ average pay 
as the proxy of CEO compensation. Since 2005, the CSRC required that CEO total 
cash compensation must be systematically recorded and disclosed. I use these newly 
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available CEO annual total compensation figures in the company as a proxy for the 
pay of the CEO, which include annual base salary, bonuses, and commissions. 
 
Below is a summary of several past studies on executive compensation (Table 1):
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Authors Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
Data Sample Main Findings 
Lewellen and 
Huntsman 
(1970) 
Cash 
compensation 
and total 
compensation 
Profitability 
variables, market 
values variables 
and total sales 
50 firms from 
Fortune magazine 
list from 1942 to 
1963 with three-
year intervals 
Cash compensation 
and total compensation 
positive related to firm 
profit and market 
value. Sales variable is 
statistically 
insignificant in all 
cases. 
Agarwal 
(1981) 
Cash 
compensation: 
salary plus 
bonus 
Job complexity 
variables, 
employer’s ability 
variables and 
human capital 
variables. 
168 U.S. life 
insurance 
companies. 
Job complexity is 
significant related 
CEO compensation, 
profit as proxy of 
employer’s ability and 
work experience as 
proxy of human capital 
are positive related to 
CEO compensation. 
Murphy (1985) Salary, bonus, 
salary plus 
Bonus, deferred 
compensation, 
stock options 
and total 
compensation 
4 position 
dummies, sales, 
stock index, stock 
variance,  
461 executives 
from 1964 to 
1981 
Executive 
compensation is 
positively related to 
company performance 
and company 
performance measured 
by shareholder return 
and growth in sales 
Coughlan and 
Schmidt 
(1985) 
Change in cash 
compensation: 
salary plus 
bonus 
Sales growth, 
stock price 
performance 
249 corporations 
from Forbes 
magazine surveys 
from 1978 to 
1980 
Change in cash 
compensation is 
positively related to 
abnormal stock price 
performance and not 
related to sales growth 
Lambert and 
Larcker (1987) 
Cash 
compensation: 
salary plus 
bonus 
ROE and security 
market return 
(RET) 
370 firms from 
1970 to 1984 
Cash compensation is 
more associated with 
accounting returns 
than with levels of 
security market 
returns. 
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Authors Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
Data Sample Main Findings 
Abowd (1990) Annual 
percentage 
increase in total 
salary and 
bonus as a 
percentage of 
base salary 
ROA, ROE, after 
tax gross 
economic return 
and total 
shareholder return 
372 firms from 
Compustat data 
file from four 
industries 1982-
1986 
Executive 
compensation is 
significantly related 
to after tax gross 
economic return and 
TSR. On the other 
hand, weak results 
reported between 
compensation and 
accounting 
performance ROA 
and ROE 
Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) 
Change in cash 
compensation, 
change in stock 
option and 
change in total 
compensation 
Change in stock 
return 
1049 firms from 
1974 to 1986 
CEO total 
compensation and 
stock option is 
relatively insensitive 
to company 
performance 
measured by stock 
return. 
Boyd (1994) Total cash 
compensation: 
salary, bonus, 
and long-term 
or deferred 
income. 
Board control 
variables, firm 
size and ROE 
193 firms in 12 
industry groups in 
1980 
CEO compensation 
not significantly 
related and firm size 
and performance 
(ROE). Also, CEO 
compensation was 
greater in firms with 
lower levels of 
control. 
Conyon (1997) Change in cash 
compensation: 
salary plus 
bonus 
Shareholder 
return, sales, 
remuneration 
committee and 
CEO duality 
dummies 
213 large UK 
companies 
between 1988 and 
1993 
CEO compensation 
is positively related 
to current 
shareholder return. 
Company with 
remuneration 
committees seems 
lower growth rates in 
top director 
compensation. 
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Authors Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
Data Sample Main Findings 
Hall and 
Liebman 
(1998) 
Change in cash 
compensation 
include salary 
and bonus, 
stock option 
Firm return in 
current 
year and last year 
478 companies in 
1980-1994 
Positive pay–
performance 
sensitivities using 
both cash 
compensation and 
stock option. 
Conyon, Peck, 
and Sadler 
(2001) 
Total cash 
compensation, 
long-term 
incentive plans 
and total 
compensation 
Total shareholder 
return, total 
capital employed, 
age, job position, 
and ROA 
100 largest U.K. 
firms from 1997-
1998 
CEO compensation 
level is lower than 
United States, pay 
gap is positive 
related to size, no 
significant 
relationship between 
compensation and 
performance. 
Hartzell and 
Starks (2003) 
Total direct 
compensation, 
change in cash 
compensation, 
and change in 
total direct 
compensation 
Change in 
shareholder 
wealth, total 
institutional 
ownership, and 
Tobin’s Q 
1,914 firms on the 
S&P ExecuComp 
database from 
1992-1997 
Ownership 
concentration is 
negatively related to 
total compensation 
but positively related 
pay–performance 
sensitivity.  
Kato and Kubo 
(2006) 
Cash 
compensation 
ROA, stock 
returns, sales, and 
number of 
employees 
51 Japanese firms 
(18 listed and 33 
unlisted firms) 
from 1986-1995 
Japanese CEOs cash 
compensation is 
indeed sensitive to 
firm performance, 
especially accounting 
measures as opposed 
to stock market 
measures.  
Firth, Fung and 
Rui (2006) 
Cash 
compensation 
Return on sales 
(ROS), stock 
return (RET), 
ownership, and 
assets 
549 Chinese-
listed companies 
from 1998-2000 
ROS and RET are 
positive related to 
CEO compensation 
but not significant. 
Size is positively and 
significantly related 
to CEO pay. 
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Authors Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
Data Sample Main Findings 
Kato, Kim and 
Lee (2007) 
Cash 
compensation 
ROA, stock 
returns, and 
growth rate 
246 firms in 
KOSPI200 from 
1998-2001 
CEO cash 
compensation is 
significantly related 
to stock market 
performance. 
Significant executive 
pay-performance 
sensitivity in Korea. 
Firth, Fung, 
and Rui (2007) 
Cash 
compensation 
ROA, stock 
returns, 
ownership, firm 
size, equity risk, 
board size, board 
composition, and 
duality  
549 Chinese-
listed companies 
from 1998-2000 
Lagged ROA is 
significantly and 
positively associated 
with CEO PAY. No 
relation between pay 
and lagged stock 
return. Size is 
positive and highly 
significant. 
Li et al. (2007) Cash 
compensation 
Board size, 
duality, 
supervision board 
size, outside 
directors, ROA, 
and firm size 
206 Chinese-
listed firms from 
2000-2001 
No statistically 
significant relation-
ship between CEO 
compensation and 
board structure 
variables (board size, 
duality, and SB size). 
Higher proportion of 
outside directors has 
a positive effect on 
CEO compensation. 
Buck, Liu, and 
Skovorod 
(2008) 
Cash 
compensation 
ROA, TSR, 
shareholder value, 
profits, firm size, 
board size, SB 
size 
601 Chinese-
listed firms from 
2000-2003 
CEO compensation 
and firm 
performance 
mutually affect each 
other through both 
reward and 
motivation. 
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Firm Performance (ROA EPS) 
Company performance can take many forms. For example, Murphy (1985) uses stock 
price as the proxy for the firm performance. Jensen and Murphy (1990) apply the 
market value of the firm as the proxy. There are two commonly used proxies in 
previous literature – accounting-based and market-based measurements. Seth (1990) 
points out that the difference between market-based and accounting-based 
measurements is that the former reflects the present value of future streams of income, 
and the latter concentrates on past performance. In addition, Pavlik, Scott, and Tiessen 
(1993) conclude that when considering cash compensation, accounting performance is 
more important compared with stock performance. On the other hand, if the 
compensation includes granted stock or stock options, in this case stock performance 
is more important. Singh and Agarwal (2003) reach a conclusion that accounting-
based performance measures are better predictors of short-term compensation 
compared with market-based performance measures. However, since the accounting 
measures are usually the proxies of profitability, they are subject to several drawbacks 
(Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin, 1987). Firstly, executives can manipulate 
accounting data to make them look good. In this case, the firm’s true value cannot be 
adequately captured. They commonly manipulate depreciation policies, change 
inventory valuation procedures, use short-term, non-capitalised leases to obtain 
productive equipment, and apply other window dressing techniques, such as holding 
borrowed money as cash until the year’s end.  
 
Poster (1985) argues that company stock is one of the most effective devices to align 
managers’ interests with those of shareholders. Dividend payments lower the retained 
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profits that are available for reinvestment, and research and development. Over time, 
the stock price will decrease. However, Deckop (1987) criticises that finding, noting 
stock prices are so volatile and are subject to external events that have nothing to do 
with the efficiency of a company. Madura, Martin, and Jessel (1996) also confirm that 
company stock prices tend to move with the market, which hides the different 
performances of different companies. Because of these concerns, some scholars 
(Bickford, 1981; Ellig, 1984) suggest using a combination of stock price and 
profitability data.  
 
In this study, I use both accounting-based and market-based measurements. The first 
one is ROA, which is defined as profits divided by the book value of total assets. This 
is how many dollars of profit they could get for each dollar of assets they have. The 
second one is EPS. This is defined as the portion of a company’s profit allocated to 
each outstanding share of common stock.  
 
Operation (Size, MB) 
Researchers are interested in the firm size–executive pay relation for several reasons. 
Firstly, executive pay is tied to firm size, because it is considered an easily recognised 
symbol of executive power and prestige. Secondly, the CEO can exercise more 
influence over firm size than performance and therefore can use firm size as a 
criterion for compensation (Kroll et al., 1990). Jensen and Murphy (1990) conclude 
that firm size could affect the pay–performance relationship. 
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Firm size is generally measured by assets, but sales can be used to determine firm size 
as well (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988; Newman and Banister, 1998). Sales 
volume is also considered a measure of firm size, because CEOs earn profit for the 
company through the volume of sales – the higher the sales volume, the higher the 
firm’s profit. In a small firm, because of the small number of units sold, even a big 
improvement in managerial efficiency does not yield a large increase in total profits. 
In contrast, in a large firm, even a small increase in profits per unit can result in a 
large increase in total profits. Thus, if the executive compensations are based on the 
sales of the firm, it will show the relation with firm size. Large firms with high sales 
volume are able to compensate CEOs with a higher base salary.  
 
Some research (Simon, 1957; Baumol, 1962) indicates that executive compensation 
should be associated with firm size. Large companies usually aim to maximise total 
sales rather than maximise profit. Moreover, as the maximum sales are often 
associated with minimum profit in economic theory, shareholders willingly accept the 
firm’s scale as the measurement of company performance. Thus, if executive 
compensation is based on the firm’s sales, this relation will be reflected in firm size. 
Further, since large companies usually have more complex job and require greater 
skill to operate, CEOs in large companies are usually paid more. Here, I use sales as a 
proxy for firm size. 
 
Firm growth opportunity also been widely considered as control factors of operation 
to affect CEO compensation in both theory and empirical literatures. Firms with high 
growth opportunity need higher quality executives. More complex operation likely to 
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brings higher pay to CEO. Consist with Core et al. (1999), firm growth opportunity 
can be measured by market to book ratio. I use market to book ratio as additional 
control variables for firm operation beside firm size.  
 
Shareholding (SOE, SAMB, SOECG, LAMB, SOELG, OTHERS, Concentration) 
A key feature of many of China’s privatised state-owned listed firms is that the state 
retains significant ownership. Thus, the listed firms are actually partially privatised. 
Chen, Firth, and Xu (2009) argue that the different forms of state ownership lead to 
different performance. They classify Chinese-listed companies by ultimate controller 
into four categories (SAMB, SOECG, SOELG, and PRIVATE). In my study, I 
presume different ownership could lead to different CEO compensation. According to 
Chinese laws and regulations, all Chinese-listed A-share companies can be divided 
into two big groups – SOEs and non-SOEs. If we consider different ultimate 
controller types, these companies can be further classified into five categories: 1) 
SAMB-SOEs administered by SASAC under the State Council; 2) SOELG-SOEs 
administered by other central government ministries; 3) LAMB-SOEs administered 
by local state asset management bureaus; 4) SOELG-SOEs administered by the local 
government; and 5) OTHERS, non-SOE companies that include private firms, 
individuals, educational institutions, or collective ownership.  
 
In the modern firm, shareholders usually monitor management actions and can take 
steps to discipline or fire poorly performing executives. However, this monitoring 
cost is very high and only large shareholders can afford it. Thus, when a firm has a 
dispersed ownership characteristic, the CEO usually has greater managerial power 
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and could award him/herself higher pay. The theoretical foundation for the use of the 
Herfindahl index as a measure for ownership concentration is provided by Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985). A standard proxy for the degree of ownership concentration is the 
Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of the squared of proportionate shareholdings of 
the three or five largest shareholders in the company. I use the Herfindahl index to 
capture the shareholding concentration for my data sample. The concentration is 
defined as the sum of squares of proportionate shareholdings of the five largest 
shareholders in the company.  
 
Board Characteristic (Board IDD IDDLOCAL DUAL) 
The board of directors represents shareholder interests, and its members normally are 
appointed by large shareholders within the corporation. The board’s major role is to 
oversee managers’ actions on behalf of the shareholders. That is, they try to ensure a 
successful alignment of mangers’ interest with that of shareholders and against 
managers who would act contrarily to such interests. 
 
The board of directors is an important internal control mechanism in corporate 
governance. Board size has an important role in determining the effectiveness of the 
board. Jensen (1993) argues that a large board finds it difficult to monitor the CEO 
effectively. That is because as the board size becomes larger, the difficulty of 
coordination, communication, and processing problems is greater than the advantage 
with more people involved.  
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Independent directors supposedly provide more independent monitoring of CEOs. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that an independent director could provide 
better monitoring. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that an independent director can 
add firm value by providing expert knowledge. However, Crystal (1991) notes that 
since the independent director are usually hired by CEOs, s/he is less effective at 
monitoring CEO compensation. In China, there are limited independent directors in 
Chinese-listed firms, and most of them are represents of state. 
 
The primary function of the chairman is to organise board meetings, monitor CEO, 
and make decisions about hiring, terminating, and compensating the CEO. A person 
with the role of both CEO and chairman would have a conflict of interest when 
carrying out these various responsibilities. Thus, if the board wants to be effective, it 
is important to separate the chairman and CEO. 
 
The effect of the board of director on CEO compensation can be captured with 
following four variables: size of the board (BOARD), proportion of the independent 
director (IDD), independent director working area (IDDLOCAL), and duality 
(DUAL). The size of the board is measured by the log of directors served on the board. 
Proportion of the independent directors is defined as the percentage of independent 
directors on the board. The independent director working area is a dummy variable. It 
is equal to 1 if working area and company headquarters are in same province, and 0 
otherwise. Duality is captured by a dummy variable. When the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board, DUAL=1, and 0 otherwise. 
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Supervisory Board (SUP) 
Supervisory board are an additional control layer in the governance structure and aim 
to monitor managers and directors. Members of the supervisory board usually consist 
of shareholders’ and workers’ representatives. A large supervisory board can address 
workers’ pay grievances in a meaningful manner. However, Dahya et al. (2002) find 
that because the supervisory board is often limited to the working report from CEOs, 
members do not have access to enough information to complete their mission. Tenev 
and Zhang (2002) suggest that CEOs can easily manipulate supervisory board to get a 
high compensation. Thus, it is important to find whether this additional monitoring 
layer operate efficient. I use size of supervisory board to proxy board quality.  The 
size of the supervisory board is measured by the log of directors served on the 
supervision board. 
 
Personal Characteristic (Age) 
From a human capital point of view, executive compensation could be affected by 
certain individual characteristic such as age, tenure, education, and so forth. A CEO 
who is and who has longer CEO tenure may have more power to design his or her 
compensation package. However, a CEO with long tenure might also receive larger 
ownership of granted stock or options. In China, it is uncommon for most firms to 
give their managers stocks or options, with the result that such data are difficult to 
uncover. Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) point out CEOs need a greater incentive to 
inspire their continued efforts necessary for both shareholders and company when 
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they reach retirement age. Therefore, the older the CEO, the greater the compensation 
s/he should receive. 
 
Madura, Martin, and Jessel (1996) find that CEO compensation may be dependent on 
an individual’s specific characteristics. It is possible that the compensation of CEO is 
related to CEO’s human capital. The older the CEOs are, the more years of work 
experience, and more accumulated human capital. Thus, CEO’s age is employed as a 
control variable.  
 
See Table 2 for a summary of all variables. 
 
 
2. Data source 
 
Since it was required that, from 2005 forward, CEO real total compensation be 
recorded and reported, my data range is from 2005-2009 and covers more than 1,300 
companies with a total of 6,383 observations. CEO compensation data were manually 
gathered from company annual reports, and company financial data were obtained 
from the GilData Company, which summarises all key items from annual reports of 
each firm regulated by the CSRC. Ownership structure data were assembled from the 
research database (CSMAR) developed by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology 
Company.  
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Executive compensation data for Chinese-listed companies were not available until 
1998. Since 1998, listed companies have been required to disclose top executive 
compensation. Required compensation disclosures in the annual report are total 
compensation to the members of the board of directors, the supervisory board, and 
senior management. The reported total compensation is the total cash compensation 
and includes base salary, bonuses, and commission. However, only the sums of the 
top three executives and the top three directors are reported. Since 2005, the CSRC 
has required that all listed companies not divide the compensation amongst board of 
directors, supervisors, and senior management. Instead, they are to provide the total 
compensation of every single director, supervisor, and senior manager. 
 
3. Methodology 
The aim of this study is to explain, predict, and test the relationship between CEO 
compensation, firm performance, and other factors in China; thus, I apply a 
quantitative approach. In quantitative research, the purpose is to quantify the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables. 
 
Economic theory considers that CEO compensation is designed to link executive pay 
to firm performance measures by shareholder returns or profit, which aligns the 
CEO’s interest with shareholders. Ogden and Watson (2004) state as an optimal 
employment, it should contain the ‘non-contingent’ salary, which aimed to attract and 
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retain high-quality executives, and the performance incentive, which aims to align the 
interests of executives and the shareholders. 
* * *( , )W w S P=  
where *W  is the optimal contract, *S  is the base salary, and *P  is the performance-
related payment.  
 
To test the relation between pay and other variables for the unbalanced panel data, I 
use Pooled-OLS (ordinary least square). Fixed effect and random effect also 
considered to capture the individual firm effects and time period effect. OLS using 
pooled data is the leading method of estimation. Fixed effects and random effects are 
used to capture the unobserved effect. The fixed effect is efficient when the error 
terms are serially unrelated and homoskedastic. The random effect is useful when the 
unobserved is considered to be uncorrelated with all the explanatory variables. All 
estimation is done using STATA 11. I begin with estimating a standard measure of 
pay–performance with the level of CEO pay as the dependent variable. The 
hypotheses constructed in the last part suggests that several factors help determine 
CEO compensation.  
 
Model 1 
CEOPAY = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝑎2𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝑎3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑎4𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝑎5𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑎6𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 +                      𝑎7𝐼𝐷𝐷 + 𝑎8𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿 + 𝑎9𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝑎10𝑆𝑈𝑃 + 𝑎11𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝑎12𝑀𝐵 + 𝑢    
                                                                                                                                          [Eq. 1] 
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The first regression shows the effect of the firm performance on CEO pay level. This 
is followed by regressions with the control variables about firm size, ownership 
characteristic, board characteristic, personal characteristic, and so forth. CEOPAY is 
the natural log of CEO total cash payment. ROA is the return on assets, which are 
used to measure the company’s profitability. EPS is the earnings per share, which is a 
market-based measure of firm performance. Size is the firm size that is measured by 
nature log of the total sales of the firm. SOE is a dummy variable equal to 1 when 
company’s largest shareholder is the state and 0 otherwise. Concentration is the 
Herfindahl index as a measure for ownership concentration. Board is the size of board 
of directors and measured by nature log of total number of board members. IDD is 
proportion of the independent directors. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 when 
CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. SUP is the natural log of total 
number of supervisors. Age is the natural log of CEO’s actual age. IDDLOCAL is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if working area of independent director and company’s 
headquarters are in same province and 0 otherwise. MB is market to book ratio. 
 
Model 2 
CEOPAY = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝑎3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑎4𝑆𝑂𝐸 + 𝑎5𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +                      𝑎6𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 + 𝑎7𝐼𝐷𝐷 + 𝑎8𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿 + 𝑎9𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝑎10𝑆𝑈𝑃 + 𝑎11𝐴𝑔𝑒 +                      𝑎12𝑀𝐵 + 𝑎13𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑢                                                                       [Eq. 2] 
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The second regression tests pay–performance relationship using lag value of 
performance variables. It aims to test whether CEO compensation is not only 
dependent on performance of the current year but also the prior year. Annual reports 
in China are usually released in the May or June of the coming year; thus, the 
performance is usually assessed with a delay.  
 
Model 3 CEOPAY = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝑎2𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝑎3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑎4𝑆𝐴𝑀𝐵 + 𝑎5𝑆𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐺 + 𝑎6𝐿𝐴𝑀𝐵 +                     𝑎7𝑆𝑂𝐸𝐿𝐺 + 𝑎8𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝑆 + 𝑎9𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑎10𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 + 𝑎11𝐼𝐷𝐷 +                     𝑎12𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿 + 𝑎13𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝑎14𝑆𝑈𝑃 + 𝑎15𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝑎16𝑀𝐵 + 𝑢        
                                                                                                                                [Eq. 3] 
According to Chinese new Company Law and characters of company operation, I 
further separate total companies by different ultimate ownership into five groups. 
SAMB is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ultimate controller is the central state 
asset management bureau (SAMBs). SOECG is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
ultimate controller is other central government ministries (SOECGs). LAMB is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the ultimate controller is local state asset management 
bureaus (LAMBs). SOELG is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ultimate controller is 
local government. OTHERS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ultimate controller 
is a private firm, individual, educational institution, or collective ownership. I set the 
OTHERS group as the base group, because it has the most companies. I compared 
each group with OTHERS to investigate whether ownership has effect on CEO 
compensation setting. My aim is to test the whether the different ultimate controller 
will have an impact on the CEO compensation. 
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To further test pay–performance sensitivities in Chinese firms, I construct the pay–
performance sensitivity model using a first-difference of log compensation (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990). A model of the change in compensation on the change in 
performance implies a contemporaneous-only relationship. 
 
Model 4 
∆CEOPAY = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝑎2∆𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝑎3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑎5𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑎6𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 +                         𝑎7𝐼𝐷𝐷 + 𝑎8𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿 + 𝑎9𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝑎10𝑆𝑈𝑃 + 𝑎11𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝑎12𝑀𝐵 + 𝑢     
                                                                                                                                [Eq. 4] 
 
∆𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑌 is the change in the CEO’s pay. ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 is the change in ROA. ∆𝐸𝑃𝑆 is the 
change in EPS. The rest of the variables are still included as the control variables. I 
applied Equation 4 for SOEs and non-SOEs separately, to see whether there are 
different stories for these two groups. Further, I applied Equation 4 for each ultimate 
controller group, which includes SAMB, SOECG, LAMB, SOELG, and OTHERS. 
These results will report under which type of ultimate controller practice companies 
achieve better corporate governance with strong pay–performance link.  
 
In addition, we also report the coefficients from the following regression that allows 
current payment revisions to be based on changes of past as well as current 
performance.  
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Model 5 
∆CEOPAY = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝑎3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑎4𝑆𝑂𝐸 +  𝑎5𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +                         𝑎6𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 + 𝑎7𝐼𝐷𝐷 + 𝑎8𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿 + 𝑎9𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝑎10𝑆𝑈𝑃 + 𝑎11𝐴𝑔𝑒 +                         𝑎12𝑀𝐵 + 𝑢                                                                                                 [Eq. 5] 
 
The reason for conducting this regression is expressed well by Jensen and Murphy 
(1990): the timing of performance payments is often ambiguous. Compensation 
decisions may be made before the fiscal year earning data become available. 
Moreover, it is possible that even with available data, the stock price change and the 
earnings increase are not incorporated into the CEO payment in the current fiscal year. 
Sometimes the measure and decision of the CEO’s conduct may not have a direct, 
immediate effect on company accounting levels or market-based performance. Jensen 
and Murphy also specify in the case of bonus, it may be paid on the basis of 
measurement in the previous year, and usually, the proxy does not clarify when the 
bonus payment year differs from the bonus measurement year. 
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V. Results 
In this section, I discussed results of my research. There are two parts including 
statistical descriptions and a discussion of empirical results. 
1. Statistical descriptions 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in all Chinese A-share 
listed companies from 2005-2009. Note that one RMB is equal to approximately 
$0.15 U.S. dollars. Average (median) CEO compensation in 2005 is 243,525 (180,000) 
RMB, in 2006 is 285,550 (210,000), in 2007 is 440,556 (275,500), in 2008 is 450,817 
(304,800), and in 2009 is 483,776 (339,200). Average (median) CEO compensation in 
2005-2009 is equivalent to U.S. dollars $36,529 ($27,000), $42,833 ($31,500), 
$66,083 ($41,325), $67,623 ($45,720), and $72,566 ($50,880). I compared CEO 
compensation levels with those of the United States (an Anglo-American system 
country), Germany (a non-Anglo-American system country), and Japan (another 
Asian country). Hodgson (2007) reports the average CEO total compensation of U.S. 
S&P 500 companies in 2006 was around $14,783,144. Fabbri (2011) reports the CEO 
pay per head in Germany’s 500 largest firms in 2006 was almost 
€700,000/$1,050,000. Lloyd (2010) reports the average top executive pay in 2004 in 
Japan 100 TSE-listed firms was around $610,000. In summary, the CEO pay level in 
China is much lower than in these developed countries that use different categories 
and apply different corporate governance systems. Although average CEO 
compensation in China has increased every year, CEO average pay in the United 
States in 2006 was still 14 times more compared with China’s CEO average pay in 
2009. The minimum CEO compensation was 140 RMB in 2005, and the maximum 
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was 47,704,000 RMB in 2009. The total number of A-share listed companies in China 
increased from 1,388 to 1,866 during the period of 2005-2009. This statistic indicates 
that a large gap persists between CEOs, and this may be because CEO compensation 
in China under different ultimate ownership types is irregular and uneven. 
 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in SAMB-controlled 
companies. There are 210, 220, 235, 240, and 255 companies in 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, and 2009 controlled under this category. The average (median) CEO 
compensation in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 is 287,314 (205,965) RMB, 
400,415 (256,000) RMB, 529,513 (350,000) RMB, 507,195 (378,667) RMB, and 
501,620 (389,000) RMB. CEO pay from 2005-2007 increased and remained around 
500,000 RMB in 2007-2009. Compared with Table 3, CEO compensation in SAMB-
controlled companies is slightly higher than the average level of the whole country.  
 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in SOECG-controlled 
companies. There are 56, 63, 75, 78, and 82 companies in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
and 2009 controlled under this category. The average (median) CEO compensation in 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 is 291,032 (256,000) RMB, 380,856 (281,143) 
RMB, 708,334 (343,000) RMB, 727,626 (438,300) RMB, and 767,269 (480000) 
RMB. The statistics are similar to SAMB-controlled firms that show CEO pay from 
2005-2007 increased rapidly and continued to increase but more slowly in 2007-2009. 
The CEO compensation level from 2007 is much higher than for SAMB-controlled 
firms and the average level of the whole country. 
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Table 6 provides descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in LAMB-controlled 
companies. There are 464, 482, 498, 510, and 521 companies in 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, and 2009 controlled under this category. The average (median) CEO 
compensation in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 is 231,517 (178,650) RMB, 
268,106 (218,000) RMB, 372,207 (282,350) RMB, 396,890 (300,000) RMB, and 
435,636 (330,000) RMB. The average CEO pay in 2006-2007 has the highest rate of 
increase, which rose about 110,000 RMB. However, the overall payment level is still 
significantly lower than that for CEOs in SAMB and SOECG groups. 
 
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in SOELG-controlled 
companies. There are 101, 117, 125, 123, and 126 companies in 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, and 2009 controlled under this category. The average (median) CEO 
compensation in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 is 215,634 (155,000) RMB, 
259,628 (170,000) RMB, 374,555 (278,750) RMB, 380,025 (267,000) RMB, and 
439,021 (320,000) RMB. SOECG-controlled companies also experienced high 
growth rates for CEO compensation in 2006-2007. This result is similar to LAMB-
controlled firms.  
 
Table 8 provides descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in OTHERS-controlled 
companies, which include private, collective, and educational institutions. There are 
503, 565, 651, 722, and 842 companies in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 
controlled under this category. The average (median) CEO compensation in 2005, 
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2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 is 223,547 (167,000) RMB, 242,550 (180,000) RMB, 
318,025 (228,000) RMB, 392,451 (267,150) RMB, and 441,260 (308,000) RMB. 
Although the pay level is relatively lower than other groups, the increase rate of CEO 
compensation in this group is steady.  
 
The above tables show two common characteristics. Firstly, the CEO compensation 
level in China has greater differences in different companies. The highest CEO 
compensation normally has dozens of times compared with the lowest CEO 
compensation. Secondly, the average CEO compensation is higher than the median of 
CEO compensation. That means most CEOs receive compensation higher than the 
standard CEO pay level under the same group. 
 
Table 9 shows descriptive statistics of key variables used in this study by type. This 
table includes the average figure of all observations. The average CEO compensation 
includes all companies and all years are 391,788 RMB. The average CEO 
compensation in SAMB- and SOECG-controlled companies is higher than the mean 
value of all companies that are 452,562 RMB and 597,227 RMB. Companies 
controlled by LAMBs, SOELGs, and OTHERS provide lower CEO average 
compensation compared with all samples. SAMB and SOECG companies present a 
large scale of sales. These two groups of companies response for national economy 
and direct administered by central government. This dominated situation is 
unachievable in companies in other groups. ROA of companies in OTHERS is 
considerably larger than that of others. However, when considering the EPS, all 
groups show similar performance, which is the reason I use both market-based and 
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accounting-based measurements to proxy the performance. The average size of boards 
of directors is around nine members in Chinese-listed companies. This result is 
similar to U.S. companies (Jensen, 1993). The proportion of independent directors is 
retained one-third across the board, and the average size of the supervisory board is 
four members.  
 
Table 10 shows descriptive statistics of key variables used in this study by year. We 
can see average CEO compensation increased each year in 2005-2009. Average sales 
also present a steady growth situation. The average value of Herfindahl, board size, 
proportion of independent directors, and supervisory board size shows nearly no 
change. 
 
Table 11 provides descriptive statistics of CEO compensation by CSRS industry 
categories as well as ultimate ownership type. Manufacturing industry has the most 
company observations, 4,556, more than half of all observations. The manufacturing 
companies belonging to OTHERS group almost account for 42% of the total number 
of manufacturing companies. CEO gets highest average compensation from the real 
estate industry, 500,081 RMB. In the real estate industry, CEO gets both the highest 
and the lowest average compensation in SAMB-controlled companies and SOELG-
controlled companies. In contrast, CEOs in the farming, forestry, animal husbandry, 
and fishery industry receive the lowest average compensation. Under the same 
industry, CEOs receive the highest and the lowest average compensation in OTHERS-
controlled companies and SOELG-controlled companies. Overall, the CEO usually 
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gets relatively lower average pay from SOECG- and LAMB-controlled companies 
across all industries.  
 
2. Empirical results 
 
Table 13 presents the regression results between CEO compensation and other 
independent variables using both accounting-based and market-based measurements. 
The results show that performance as measured by ROA is statistically significant at 
the 10% level. This means there is a positive relationship between CEO compensation 
and company performance in Chinese corporations. This result is similar to earlier 
prior research (Buck et al. 2008; Firth, Fung, and Rui 2007; Kato and Long 2006; Li 
et al. 2007). In contrast, Li and Xia (2006) report that that there is no significant 
positive relation between annual compensation of senior management and firm 
performance. In addition, ROE is also a commonly used accounting performance 
proxy. Both Chen (2006) and Tao, Wei, and Li (2007) find positive relations between 
CEO compensation and ROE. The Chinese government has practiced modern 
corporate governance system only in the past two decades. They have worked to 
improve to better governance structures and as result, the relationship between pay 
and performance should be positive. 
 
Company size has a very strong positive relationship with CEO pay. This result is in 
line with most past research (Firth, Fung, and Rui 2007; Jensen and Murphy 1990; 
Kato and Long 2006; Rosen 1992). After controlling for firm size and other variables, 
the SOE dummy is negatively related to CEO pay. This result indicates that CEO pay 
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in state or government controlled company (SOEs) is lower than in private and other 
form controlled company (non-SOEs). The ownership concentration is negatively 
related to CEO pay. The special characteristic of highly concentrated ownership in 
China has some degree of influence in monitoring CEO behaviour and compensation 
setting. Companies with higher concentrated ownership tend to pay a lower degree of 
CEO compensation. Both board size and proportion of independent directories are 
positively related to CEO pay. These results are consistent with my Hypothesis 6 and 
Hypothesis 5.1. In addition, a negative relationship between the size of supervisory 
board and CEO pay has been reported. This result is not what I expected according to 
previous studies in China. However, this is a good sign for Chinese corporate 
governance. One possible reason for this result is my dataset use CEO real pay as 
proxy of CEO compensation and data range is more recent. New Chinese Company 
Law established from 2006 and required board member of supervisory board should 
contain at least 1/3 worker representative which differ from old Company Law. As I 
argued before, worker representative seems to be more efficient on the board of 
supervisors.  
 
After controlling for other variables, CEO duality is positively related to CEO pay. 
That means having a chairman’s status bring greater compensation to CEO. Previous 
literature shows a mixed picture of the relation between duality and performance. 
Some argue that with different people in the chairman and CEO positions, the board 
can achieve better monitoring and control over the CEO. However, Donaldson and 
Davis (1991) argue that duality can help CEOs make quick decisions and outperform 
other companies. On the empirical side, some suggest a positive relationship between 
CEO duality and CEO pay (Brickley et al. 1997; Core et al. 1999). In contrast, 
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Conyon (1997) finds no effect in his British data sample. Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007) 
show that for China, the chairman position will set CEO pay that is unrelated to 
company performance. In my data sample, about 200 companies have duality and 
most of them come from SOEs. From managerial power point of view, if the CEOs 
are also the chairman at the same time, they have extra power to control board. Board 
of directors either working inefficient or totally lose function. The working area of 
independent directors also effect CEO compensation. After control other variables, 
CEO gets higher pay when independent director especially financial one working area 
and company headquarters are in same province. Independent directors could be 
easily influenced by CEO if they are in same province. Social network in china is very 
important. Independent directors would happy to receive wider interpersonal 
relationship introduced by CEO. Thus, independent directors are likely to work 
cooperative with CEO. In addition, CEO pay in Chinese corporations especially in 
SOEs increases progressively with age. The result shows a significant positive 
relationship between CEO pay and CEO age in all significant regressions.  
 
The EPS as market-based performance indicator is strongly related to CEO pay. This 
result offered further indications that CEO compensation is linked with company 
performance in Chinese-listed firms. Compared with ROA, EPS presented more 
explanatory power on pay–performance relationship. The rest of the variables have 
similar results with links to CEO pay. This result is consistent with past research on 
corporate governance internationally (Gao and Song, 2007; Singh and Agarwal, 2003; 
Zhang, Zhao, and Zhang, 2003). 
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In addition, I put both performance variables into the same equation. I found no 
relation between ROA and CEO pay. On the other hand, EPS still exhibits a very 
strong relationship with CEO pay. This result means there is some interaction 
between ROA and EPS. In this case, EPS is a better variable to explain pay–
performance relationship in Chinese-listed firms. 
 
In Model 2, I use the lagged value of performance variables to test the pay–
performance relationship. As shown in Table 14, I found the relationship between 
ROA and CEO pay went from positive to no relationship after controlling for other 
variables. This result indicates that CEO pay does not relate to last year’s accounting 
performance. The CEO compensation setting depends more on the current year’s 
financial performance. In contrast, lagged EPS remains a strong positive relationship 
with CEO pay after controlling for other variables. This result means the setting of 
CEO compensation depends on both current year and past year market performance. 
CEOs are rewarded not solely by the performance of the current year but also the 
difference from last year. Junarsin (2011) finds similar results when using lagged 
value of ROA and EPS.  
 
Table 15 presents different CEO pay levels under different ultimate controller types. I 
use OTHERS as base group, because OTHERS is the biggest subgroup. After 
controlling for ROA, EPS, firm size, and other variables, SAMB, LAMB, and 
SOELG are negatively related OTHERS. Only SOECG is positively related OTHERS. 
In other words, CEO pay level is lower in SAMB-, LAMB-, and SOELG-controlled 
companies compared with private and other companies. In the meantime, CEO pay in 
134 
 
SAMB-controlled companies is higher than LAMB-controlled companies and 
SOELG-controlled companies. CEO pay in SOECG-controlled companies is higher 
than in privately controlled companies. This result is different from my Hypothesis 
3.2. One possible explanation of this result is that most companies in this category are 
banking companies, insurance companies, security companies, and other state 
monopolies. These companies usually have an important effect on the Chinese 
economy, and CEOs in these companies need higher skills and more experience. The 
central government tends to provide a subsidy and set a higher compensation level for 
these CEOs to encourage their good management of the company. However, CEO 
compensation in SOECG-controlled companies was subject to very high restrictions 
from the central government that changed the rule of CEO compensation being 
dependent on company performance. In order to test this hypothesis, I changed the 
performance control variable to EPS to see if there was any difference under a 
different model. It turns out that with EPS the result stays the same. CEO pay in 
private and other companies is still higher than in SAMB-, LAMB-, and SOELG-
controlled companies. SOECG-controlled companies outperform the other four 
groups in terms of CEO compensation. These results are consistent with Firth et al. 
(2007) who note that companies with significant government ownership have lower 
CEO compensation than do private companies.  
 
In stage two, I test pay–performance sensitivities in Chinese-listed companies using a 
different combination. This approach is introduced by Jensen and Murphy (1990), and 
it has been well-used after that. Firstly, I use change of ROA as performance indicator 
to test pay–performance sensitivity. I have divided all A-share listed companies into 
two groups named SOEs and non-SOEs. Table 16 shows that there is a positive and 
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significant relationship between change in pay and change in ROA in SOEs. In 
contrast, it shows no significant pay–performance sensitivities in non-SOEs. These 
results can be explained as follows. SOEs have a very high concentrated ownership 
structure and relatively higher degrees of regulations and restrictions. A change in 
CEO pay is more depends on a change in company performance. On the other hand, 
CEO pay setting in non-SOEs is more flexible, because most of them originate from 
family or group businesses. They have not been subject to the modern corporate 
governance to as great an extent. Further, it is not dependent only on change in 
company accounting performance reported on the balance sheet every year. In 
addition, I test pay–performance sensitivity using change in EPS as a performance 
indicator. I find different and interesting results compared with the last regression. 
Change in pay remains a strong positive relationship with change in EPS in SOEs. 
Change in pay also presents a positive relationship with change in EPS in non-SOEs. 
This result means when performance is linked to shareholder wealth in non-SOEs, a 
change in pay could be linked to a change in company performance. The owner of a 
non-SOE tends to pay more attention to market-based performance, that is, EPS rather 
than those that are accounting based. In summary, if we divided all Chinese A-share 
listed companies into SOEs and non-SOEs, SOEs practice better governance 
mechanisms with strong pay–performance relationship. 
 
According to company ultimate controller types, I further divided all companies into 
five subgroups named SAMBs, SOECGs, LAMBs, SOELGs, and OTHERS. Table 18 
shows pay–performance sensitivities are various in these different groups. When I use 
change in ROA as performance proxy, change in pay of SOECGs, SOELGs and 
OTHERS have no significant relationship with change in ROA. On the other hand, 
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SAMBs and LAMBs reflect positive pay–performance sensitivities. In addition, 
SAMBs present a better coefficient compared with LAMBs. Then, I applied EPS as a 
performance proxy. The results are similar to those found in Tables 16 and 17, the 
change of EPS shows stronger explanatory power over the changes of CEO 
compensation. Coefficients for the change of EPS, except those for SOECG and 
OTHERS controlled firms, are positive and statistically significant. Although firms 
with SOECG as their ultimate controller pay their CEO the highest amount of 
compensation, there is no relation between change of CEO pay in SOECG and 
changes of EPS. This can be explained because most firms in this group are in 
banking or transportation industries, which are subject to strict regulation and 
monitoring. The extent of compensation increase has been limited and capped. In 
2008, the Ministry of Finance in China issued a decree restricting the increase of the 
compensation in the financial industry, although performance has improved 
significantly, in order adapt to both the domestic and international economic situation 
as well as promote the fair distribution of wealth amongst all the industries. 
 
In summary, companies controlled by SAMBs and LAMBs have better pay–
performance relationships. That indicates SAMBs and LAMBs have more efficient 
corporate governance mechanisms with strong performance-related incentives offered 
to their top executives. They have tried to achieve a greater marketisation 
management mode with less government influence. Further, they have introduced 
several key elements from the modern Western corporate governance system. They 
hire a number of highly skilled experts or professional workers as employees with 
better operations. In the next stage, SOELGs and SOECGs should have a series of 
reforms to acquire a more efficient corporate governance system. Corporate 
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governance in privately listed companies is uneven. One possible reason for this 
phenomenon is that large, old companies have better governance structures compare 
with new, smaller companies. They, too, need to adopt more Western-style 
governance models to improve their operational quality and efficiency.  
 
Finally, I tested whether past performance will effect change in CEO pay. Table 20 
shows regression of pay-performance sensitivities using lag value of performance 
variables. Neither lag value of ROA nor lag value of EPS has any relationship on 
change of CEO pay. These results indicate that change in CEO compensation in 
Chinese-listed companies does not depend on the company’s past performance.  
 
3. Robustness test 
 
In order to test the robustness of my results, I employed four types of methods and 
estimation results separated into table 21, table 22, table 23, table 24, table 25, table 
26 and table 27. Most results are similar as my main results which indicate that my 
estimations are robust.  
 
Firstly, I adopt natural log of company total assets as alternative indicator of company 
size. Company total assets are also common used size indicator suggested by previous 
empirical works as I described before. With company total assets, ROA is more 
significant with CEO compensation and the coefficient is better than that used sales. 
Other variables remain strong and significant relation with CEO compensation. In 
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addition, scholars applied different variables to proxy both accounting-based 
performance and market-based performance (Abowd 1990; Firth et al. 2006, 2007; 
Kato and Long 2006; Conyon and He 2008). In that case, I use ROE replace ROA as 
measurement of accounting-based performance and annual stock return replace EPS 
as measurement of market-based performance. Regression results listed in table 22 
and most results remain consistent with my main findings. 
 
Secondly, I cut my full sample data into a smaller sample which include data from 
2005 to 2007. The reason for this estimation is to find whether there is time effects 
exist in my dataset.  As shows in table 23, all results are consists with my main 
findings. Alternatively, I introduce year dummy variables into regressions to control 
time effects and reported into table 24. The results of this estimation are similar as 
first method that consists with my main results. 
 
Thirdly, I introduced industry dummies into my main regressions. As shows in table 
25, all results are similar with my previous estimations.  
 
Finally, according to firth et al. (2007) and firth et al. (2010), the region may have 
impact on CEO compensation. To test whether this phenomenon effect pay-
performance relationship in my study, I use two kind of index to control region effect. 
First, I use consumption level index of each province from 2005 to 2009.  I calculate 
average level of each province for these 5 years, then generate an average level of all 
provinces.  Provinces with higher than average consumption level are coded to 1 and 
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represent more developed areas. Provinces with lower than average consumption level 
are coded to 0 and represent less developed areas. Table 26 shows results with control 
of region. The results are consists with my main findings. Second, I replace 
consumption level index by GDP index.  The results remain consistent as shows in 
table 27. 
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VI. Conclusion 
This dissertation investigates the relationship between CEO compensation and firm 
performance, with considerations regarding the control of the ultimate shareholder, 
firm size, ownership concentration, size of board, size of independent directors, size 
of supervision board, duality, and other control factors. The agency theory literature 
suggests that because of the separation of ownership and management, CEOs always 
seek to maximise their own interests rather than those of shareholders. This is due to 
the disparity between the agent and principal in terms of interest and risk attitude. 
CEO compensation as a corporate governance internal mechanism has been 
considered as an effective way to align CEOs interests with shareholders.  
 
This topic has been examined intensively in developed countries. However, there is a 
relatively small amount of literature focussed on emerging countries, especially China. 
China has come through a series of economic reforms and policies of opening up 
trade and commerce, especially concerning the reform of SOEs. Chinese companies 
have grown increasingly aware of the importance of modern corporate governance 
systems. They are keen to solve agency problems by introducing both internal and 
external mechanisms. These make transitory China a unique and interesting research 
subject from the perspective of corporate governance. I contribute to the literature by 
providing evidence of the relationship between CEO compensation and firm 
performance with newly released data of individual CEO compensation. I have 
explored CEO compensation under different ownership characteristics.  
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I offer two ways of classifying the different ownership structures. Firstly, I divide my 
sample into two subsamples: SOEs and non-SOEs. Then, I subdivide those into five 
groups according to the property of ultimate shareholders: 1) SAMB-SOEs 
administered by SASAC under the State Council; 2) SOELG-SOEs administered by 
SOECGs; 3) LAMB-SOEs administered by LAMBs; 4) SOEs administered by the 
local government; and 5) OTHERS, non-SOE companies that include private firms, 
individuals, educational institutions, or collective ownership. 
 
My results show that a positive relation exists between CEO compensation and firm 
performance, especially when the performance is measured by market-based variables. 
The larger the firm size, the higher the CEO compensation. Moreover, the diverse 
ownership leads to higher compensation in my data sample; and the size of the board 
of directors and independent directors contribute positively as well to the CEO 
compensation. In addition, the age of the CEO, the size of the supervision board, and 
past performance also have an impact on CEO compensation. Further, SOEs tend to 
offer their CEOs a lower compensation package than do non-SOEs. In the five-group 
scenario, CEO compensation in privately controlled companies is higher than in the 
three-group one, but lower than the SOECGs. In addition, while a change of 
performance is positively related to the changes of CEO compensation in the full 
sample, no relation was found for companies controlled by SOECGs. The contrast 
between a high compensation level and an insignificant relation with performance in 
SOECG can be explained by the fact that most firms in this group are found in the 
financial and transportation industry, which offers good economic benefits and is 
subject to strict regulation and monitoring.  
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Overall, our results show that the increase in CEO compensation results from the 
economic improvement rather than poor corporate governance. However, we still find 
unbalanced resources available for companies with different ownership properties, in 
terms of fund allocation, human resources, and policy subsidy. With the corporate 
governance standard improving greatly in the future, we expect to see CEOs given 
more autonomy, becoming more involved with decision-making, and having greater 
accountability. There will be a stronger relation between CEO compensation and firm 
performance, especially non-SOEs and firms from certain highly regulated industries. 
CEO duality will be gradually eliminated and CEO compensation will reflect 
international market forces. Further, the Chinese government should encourage 
financial disclosure. Improving transparency in the disclosure process will improve 
the effect of external mechanisms, such as the managerial labour market, and legal 
and regulatory systems. All these changes will provide additional data for future 
research.  
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VIII. Tables 
Table 1 Summary of several past studies on executive compensation 
 
Table 2 Summary of all variables 
 
                        
Variables 
 
Definition 
       
  
Compensation               
CEOPAY 
 
Natural log of CEO Total cash compensation: includes base salary, bonuses and commission   
  
 
      
   
  
Performance 
 
      
   
  
ROA 
 
Return on assets, after tax profits divided by the book value of total assets (Accounting-based) 
EPS 
 
 
Earnings per share, the portion of a company's profit allocated to each outstanding share of 
common stock 
  
          
  
Operation 
          
  
SIZE 
 
Natural log of total volume of sales 
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Ownership 
          
  
SOE 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if state is the largest shareholder in the company   
SAMB 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by state asset management bureaus 
SOECG 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by central government 
 
  
SOELG 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by local government 
 
  
LAMB 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by local state management bureaus 
Others 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by individual or family 
 
  
Concentration 
 
Sum of the squared of proportionate shareholdings of the five largest shareholders in the company 
  
          
  
Board Characteristics 
          
  
Board 
 
The size of the board: natural log of total number of directors on the board 
  
  
IDD 
 
Proportion of the independent directors: percentage of independent directors on the board 
SUP 
 
The size of the supervision board: natural log of total number of supervisors on the board   
DUAL 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO also company's chairman 
  
  
IDDLOCAL 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if independent director and the company are in the same province 
  
          
  
Control Variables 
          
  
AGE 
 
Natural log CEO’s age 
      
  
MB  Market to book ratio        
          
Others          
△PAY 
 
Change in pay: current year minus last year 
    
  
△ROA 
 
Change in ROA: current year minus last year 
    
  
△EPS   Change in EPS: current year minus last year           
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in all Chinese A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2009 
 
 
  
 
 Descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in all Chinese A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2009 
 
       
 
          
 Year number of company number of CEO pay min pay max pay mean pay median 
       2005 1388 1054 140 2756000 243524.98 180000 
2006 1495 1253 2000 5845000 285550.08 210000 
2007 1628 1414 3400 47704000 440556.17 275500 
2008 1723 1459 3300 9548700 450816.98 304800 
2009 1866 1460 5300 11702700 483776.24 339200 
       
 
 
*Data from 2005 to 2009 and pay in Chinese RMB 
*Year is calendar year; number of company is total number of listed companies in A-share in China; number of CEO is CEOs with available compensation              
data; pay min is minimum value of CEO annual total compensation; pay max is maximum value of CEO annual total compensation; pay mean is mean value   
of CEO annual total compensation; pay median is median value of CEO annual total compensation. 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in SAMB controlled companies 
 
 
 
      Descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in SAMB controlled companies 
     
      
 
        
  Year number of company number of CEO pay min pay max pay mean pay median 
       2005 210 158 7763 2756000 287314.16 205965 
2006 220 181 14600 5845000 400415.3 256000 
2007 235 195 25000 7105300 529512.77 350000 
2008 240 200 10800 6846400 507194.88 378667.2 
2009 255 196 22600 5200000 501619.79 389000 
       
 
 
 
*Data from 2005 to 2009 and pay in Chinese RMB 
*Year is calendar year; number of company is total number of listed companies in A-share in China; number of CEO is CEOs with available compensation              
data; pay min is minimum value of CEO annual total compensation; pay max is maximum value of CEO annual total compensation; pay mean is mean value   
of CEO annual total compensation; pay median is median value of CEO annual total compensation. 
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in SOECG controlled companies 
 
 
 
       
      Descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in SOECG controlled companies 
  
       
 
        
  Year number of company number of CEO pay min pay max pay mean pay median 
       2005 56 49 12000 2678300 291031.61 256000 
2006 63 51 2000 4461800 380855.55 281143 
2007 75 64 12000 9631000 708333.89 343000 
2008 78 63 12000 7892800 727626.21 438300 
2009 82 63 10000 5306000 767268.75 480000 
       
 
 
*Data from 2005 to 2009 and pay in Chinese RMB 
*Year is calendar year; number of company is total number of listed companies in A-share in China; number of CEO is CEOs with available compensation              
data; pay min is minimum value of CEO annual total compensation; pay max is maximum value of CEO annual total compensation; pay mean is mean value   
of CEO annual total compensation; pay median is median value of CEO annual total compensation. 
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in LAMB controlled companies 
 
 
 
 
      Descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in LAMB controlled companies 
  
       
 
        
  Year number of company number of CEO pay min pay max pay mean pay median 
       2005 464 354 140 1807000 231517.19 178650 
2006 482 415 5700 1950000 268105.78 218000 
2007 498 446 10000 5729100 372207.44 282350 
2008 510 441 3300 4997000 396889.71 300000 
2009 521 413 11664 4566000 435636.34 330000 
       
 
*Data from 2005 to 2009 and pay in Chinese RMB 
*Year is calendar year; number of company is total number of listed companies in A-share in China; number of CEO is CEOs with available compensation              
data; pay min is minimum value of CEO annual total compensation; pay max is maximum value of CEO annual total compensation; pay mean is mean value   
of CEO annual total compensation; pay median is median value of CEO annual total compensation. 
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Table 7 Descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in SOELG controlled companies 
 
 
 
      Descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in SOELG controlled companies 
  
       
 
        
  
Year number of company number of CEO pay min pay max pay mean pay median 
       2005 101 83 21600 966000 215633.65 155000 
2006 117 103 28200 1250000 259628.25 170000 
2007 125 110 30000 2950000 374554.79 278750 
2008 123 110 31300 3663400 380024.69 267000 
2009 126 95 5300 2706000 439021.33 320000 
       
 
 
*Data from 2005 to 2009 and pay in Chinese RMB 
*Year is calendar year; number of company is total number of listed companies in A-share in China; number of CEO is CEOs with available compensation              
data; pay min is minimum value of CEO annual total compensation; pay max is maximum value of CEO annual total compensation; pay mean is mean value   
of CEO annual total compensation; pay median is median value of CEO annual total compensation. 
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Table 8 Descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in OTHERS controlled companies 
 
 
 
 
      Descriptive statistics of CEO compensation in OTHERS controlled companies 
  
       
 
        
  Year number of company number of CEO pay min pay max pay mean pay median 
       2005 503 380 8307 1399464 223546.89 167000 
2006 565 475 7200 1494064 242550.06 180000 
2007 651 563 3400 4210000 318025.13 228000 
2008 722 608 5000 4580000 392450.61 267150 
2009 842 663 10000 4860000 441259.85 308000 
       
 
 
*Data from 2005 to 2009 and pay in Chinese RMB 
*Year is calendar year; number of company is total number of listed companies in A-share in China; number of CEO is CEOs with available compensation              
data; pay min is minimum value of CEO annual total compensation; pay max is maximum value of CEO annual total compensation; pay mean is mean value   
of CEO annual total compensation; pay median is median value of CEO annual total compensation. 
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Table 9 Descriptive statistics of key variables used in this study by type 
 
 
                     Descriptive statistics of key variables used in this study 
 
  
       
Variables ALL SAMB SOECG SOELG LAMB OTHERS 
CEOPAY 391787.84 452561.56 597227.36 338024.09 345177.22 338554.3 
ROA 2.4748464 0.0299399 0.0230869 0.0187632 0.0241668 6.0715152 
EPS 0.2263364 0.2554672 0.2255123 0.1733037 0.2523608 0.2026012 
Size 5359583389 12763110325 25646230282 4481511921 4082031462 1394367526 
BOARD 9.3190876 9.8676599 9.8853868 9.7945205 9.4516262 8.7556993 
IDD 3.3105177 3.5004382 3.4469914 3.4195205 3.341986 3.1395564 
SUP 4.022562 4.4019264 4.5415473 4.2418525 4.2679308 3.5584975 
       
 
*Mean value of variables used in model. Data include all companies and all years from 2005 to 2009; SAMB, SOECG, LAMB, SOELG and OTHERS represent 
different ultimate ownership type.  
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Table 10 Descriptive statistics of key variables used in this study by year 
 
  
              Descriptive statistics of key variables used in this study by year 
 
  
         
Year CEOPAY ROA EPS Size Herfindahl BOARD IDD SUP 
2005 243469.3 -0.0169026 0.0881792 2940000000 0.2120592 9.572927 0.3476476 4.129647 
2006 285587.6 0.0132889 0.1801195 3700000000 0.1712266 9.444087 0.3510593 4.070796 
2007 443056.3 0.6304457 0.3625921 6320000000 0.1746687 9.407542 0.3591782 4.063089 
2008 444248.5 -0.005506 0.1909696 7090000000 0.1726202 9.251408 0.3614917 3.969718 
2009 484952.8 0.0332453 0.311849 7270000000 0.179048 9.131906 0.3657307 3.927486 
         
*Mean value of variables used in model. Data include all companies in each year from 2005 to 2009 
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Table 11 Descriptive statistics of CEO compensation by CSRS industry categories as well as ultimate controller type 
 
 
 
Descriptive statistics of CEO compensation by CSRS industry categories as well as ultimate controller type 
 
   
                   CRSC industry categories 
 
Num  SAMB 
 
Num   SOECG 
 
Num   LAMB 
 
Num   SOELG 
 
Num   OTHERS 
 
Num   ALL 
                   Farming, Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry, And Fishery A 10 225617 
 
10 173571.4 
 
65 175331 
 
11 53441.5 
 
83 236914.5 
 
181 201166.7 
                   Mining B 44 490813 
 
11 731296.7 
 
105 370675.5 
 
NA NA 
 
16 125527.3 
 
180 407843.9 
                   Manufacturing C 688 374137 
 
151 272662.4 
 
1335 332745.7 
 
295 297313.4 
 
1984 330810.9 
 
4556 335480.4 
                   Utilities D 108 412888 
 
15 318600 
 
146 293049 
 
26 245621.6 
 
26 261016.5 
 
326 331286.1 
                   Construction E 37 681525 
 
14 468507.1 
 
67 253994.8 
 
NA NA 
 
61 416480.3 
 
179 417056.3 
                   Transportation And 
Warehousing F 72 684857 
 
19 486752.6 
 
124 329095.6 
 
64 311878.8 
 
40 416157.2 
 
333 410258 
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* Industry categories are classified by CSRC; Num is number of companies under this category; SAMB, SOECG, LAMB, SOELG and OTHERS represent 
different ultimate ownership type.  
 
 
 
                   Information Technology G 95 427175 
 
27 372648 
 
73 225121 
 
10 277925 
 
284 326872.6 
 
511 358923.1 
                   Wholesale And Retail Trade H 41 378959 
 
15 586560 
 
199 436754.8 
 
29 375189.9 
 
166 288853.6 
 
460 381749 
                   Finance And Insurance I 4 1762325 
 
31 2855814 
 
20 679533.3 
 
10 1843400 
 
15 1695740 
 
127 2732240 
                   Real Estate J 25 1807375 
 
11 481825 
 
159 486579.8 
 
46 323133.7 
 
259 428423.1 
 
509 500080.7 
                   Social Services K 20 637080 
 
18 723831.7 
 
86 326464 
 
30 183904.7 
 
92 456735.3 
 
246 410919.5 
                   Communication And Cultural 
Industries L 6 279717 
 
5 512650 
 
NA NA 
 
40 369226.3 
 
14 245500 
 
65 348525.9 
                   Conglomerates M 10 432930 
 
27 500192.5 
 
96 421122 
 
31 452728 
 
243 287454.1 
 
427 361992.1 
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Table 12 Correlation matrix 
 
  CEOPAY ROA EPS SIZE SOE Herfindahl Board IDD SUP IDDLOCAL DUAL AGE MB 
CEOPAY 1 
            ROA 0.0093 1 
           EPS 0.2395 0.0914 1 
          SIZE 0.4111 -0.032 0.2632 1 
         SOE -0.0345 -0.0096 0.0069 0.1251 1 
        Herfindahl 0.0336 -0.0108 0.126 0.2881 0.1927 1 
       Board 0.1231 -0.0239 0.0771 0.26 0.1443 0.0308 1 
      IDD 0.0461 0.0388 0.006 0.0051 -0.046 0.0416 -0.2926 1 
     SUP 0.0326 -0.0092 0.0393 0.1919 0.1671 0.067 0.3388 -0.1007 1 
    IDDLOCAL 0.0491 0.017 0.0204 0.0299 0.0263 0.0563 -0.0512 0.0136 0.0161 1 
   DUAL 0.05 -0.0078 -0.0333 -0.0974 -0.0952 -0.0562 -0.091 0.0529 -0.0924 -0.004 1 
  AGE 0.1029 -0.0021 0.0063 0.0905 0.0968 0.0463 0.0906 -0.034 0.083 0.0539 0.1301 1 
 MB -0.02 -0.0054 0.0043 -0.0298 -0.0282 -0.0114 -0.0362 -0.0137 -0.002 0.0205 0.0184 0.02 1 
 
* CEOPAY (Dependent variable) is natural log of CEO total cash compensation. ROA is return on assets. EPS is earnings per share. Size is log of company total annual sales. 
SOE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by state. Herfindahl is concentration measured by Herfindahl 5 index. Board is log of board size which measured by 
total numbers of directors on the board. IDD is proportion of independent directors on the board. SUP is log of total numbers of supervisors on board of supervisors. 
IDDLOCAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if working area of independent director and company’s headquarters are in same province. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if CEO is also the chairman of the company. Age is log of CEO natural age. MB is market to book ratio.  
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Table 13 Regression of CEO compensation on firm performance and other factors 
            
Variables Accounting-based 
 
Market-based 
 
Combined 
  Performance=ROA   performance=EPS   ROA and EPS 
Intercept 4.17*** 
 
4.60*** 
 
4.60*** 
 
(12.02) 
 
(13.44) 
 
(13.44) 
ROA 0.18* 
   
0.02 
 
(1.65) 
   
(0.20) 
EPS 
  
0.24*** 
 
0.24*** 
   
(15.05) 
 
(14.95) 
Size 0.25*** 
 
0.23*** 
 
0.23*** 
 
(34.64) 
 
(30.91) 
 
(30.88) 
SOE -0.13*** 
 
-0.12*** 
 
-0.12*** 
 
(-5.97) 
 
(-5.49) 
 
(-5.49) 
Concentration -0.63*** 
 
-0.71*** 
 
-0.71*** 
 
(-7.13) 
 
(-8.20) 
 
(-8.20) 
Board 0.39*** 
 
0.36*** 
 
0.36*** 
 
(6.86) 
 
(6.48) 
 
(6.48) 
IDD 1.10*** 
 
1.08*** 
 
1.08*** 
 
(4.98) 
 
(4.99) 
 
(4.98) 
SUP -0.10*** 
 
-0.10*** 
 
-0.10*** 
 
(-2.84) 
 
(-2.76) 
 
(-2.76) 
IDDLOCAL 0.07*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
(3.51) 
 
(3.43) 
 
(3.43) 
DUAL 0.19*** 
 
0.19*** 
 
0.19*** 
 
(6.14) 
 
(6.16) 
 
(6.16) 
Age 0.52*** 
 
0.55*** 
 
0.55*** 
 
(6.39) 
 
(6.86) 
 
(6.86) 
MB -0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 (-0.22) (-0.50) (-0.50) 
      
Observations 6383 
 
6383 
 
6383 
Adjusted-R2 0.2047 
 
0.2317 
 
0.2316 
F-stat 150.34   175.94   161.25 
CEOPAY (Dependent variable) is natural log of CEO total cash compensation. Two performance 
measures were used in regression. ROA is return on assets which represent accounting based 
performance. EPS is earnings per share which represent market based performance. Size is log of 
company total annual sales. SOE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by state. 
Concentration is sum of squares of proportionate shareholdings of the five largest shareholders in the 
company. Board is log of board size which measured by total numbers of directors on the board. IDD 
is proportion of independent directors on the board. SUP is log of total numbers of supervisors on 
board of supervisors. IDDLOCAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if working area of independent 
director and company’s headquarters are in same province. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
CEO is also the chairman of the company. Age is log of CEO natural age. MB is market to book ratio.  
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcances at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 14 Regression of CEO compensation on firm performance and other factors 
using lag value of performance variables 
            
Variables Accounting-based 
 
Market-based 
 
Combined 
  Performance=ROA   performance=EPS   ROA and EPS 
Intercept 1.36*** 
 
1.58*** 
 
1.58*** 
 
(4.60) 
 
(5.32) 
 
(5.33) 
ROA t-1 0.53 
   
-0.80 
 
(0.36) 
   
(-0.52) 
EPS t-1 
  
0.10*** 
 
0.11*** 
   
(5.38) 
 
(9.03) 
CEOPAY t-1 0.71*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 
 (66.15)  (63.22)  (63.16) 
Size 0.07*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
(10.04) 
 
(9.02) 
 
(9.03) 
SOE -0.05*** 
 
-0.04** 
 
-0.04** 
 
(-2.56) 
 
(-2.36) 
 
(-2.37) 
Concentration -0.15* 
 
-0.19*** 
 
-0.19*** 
 
(-1.92) 
 
(-2.45) 
 
(-2.45) 
Board 0.06 
 
0.06 
 
0.06 
 
(1.18) 
 
(1.23) 
 
(1.24) 
IDD 0.15 
 
0.16 
 
0.17 
 
(0.83) 
 
(0.89) 
 
(0.90) 
SUP 0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
(0.62) 
 
(0.67) 
 
(0.65) 
IDDLOCAL 0.03** 
 
0.04** 
 
0.04** 
 
(1.99) 
 
(2.24) 
 
(2.25) 
DUAL 0.07*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
(2.74) 
 
(2.76) 
 
(2.75) 
Age 0.20*** 
 
0.21*** 
 
0.21*** 
 
(2.89) 
 
(3.09) 
 
(3.09) 
MB 0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 (0.97) (1.02) (1.02) 
      
Observations 4297 
 
4297 
 
4297 
Adjusted-R2 0.604 
 
0.6066 
 
0.6066 
F-stat 547.04   533.13   510.51 
CEOPAY (Dependent variable) is natural log of CEO total cash compensation. Two performance measures were 
used in regression. ROAt-1 is lag value of return on assets which represent accounting based performance. EPS t-
1 is lag value of earnings per share which represent market based performance. CEOPAYt-1 is lag value of 
CEOPAY. Size is log of company total annual sales. SOE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by 
state. Concentration is sum of squares of proportionate shareholdings of the five largest shareholders in the 
company. Board is log of board size which measured by total numbers of directors on the board. IDD is 
proportion of independent directors on the board. SUP is log of total numbers of supervisors on board of 
supervisors. IDDLOCAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if working area of independent director and company’s 
headquarters are in same province. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is also the chairman of the 
company. Age is log of CEO natural age. MB is market to book ratio.  
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcances at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 15 Regression of CEO compensation under different ultimate controller 
types 
        
Variables Accounting-based 
 
Market-based 
  Performance=ROA   performance=EPS 
Intercept 3.98*** 
 
4.46*** 
 
(11.31) 
 
(12.85) 
ROA 0.18* 
  
 
(1.63) 
  EPS 
  
0.24*** 
   
(14.98) 
Size 0.26*** 
 
0.23*** 
 
(34.88) 
 
(30.95) 
SAMB -0.09*** 
 
-0.06* 
 
(-2.76) 
 
(-1.84) 
SOECG 0.10* 
 
0.12** 
 
(1.85) 
 
(2.36) 
LAMB -0.19*** 
 
-0.17*** 
 
(-7.37) 
 
(-6.72) 
SOELG -0.20*** 
 
-0.18*** 
 
(-4.89) 
 
(-4.43) 
Concentration -0.64*** 
 
-0.73*** 
 
(-7.23) 
 
(-8.38) 
Board 0.37*** 
 
0.34*** 
 
(6.60) 
 
(6.20) 
IDD 1.11*** 
 
1.09*** 
 
(5.02) 
 
(5.04) 
SUP -0.09*** 
 
-0.09*** 
 
(-2.49) 
 
(-2.50) 
IDDLOCAL 0.09*** 
 
0.08*** 
 
(4.12) 
 
(4.00) 
DUAL 0.18*** 
 
0.18*** 
 
(5.86) 
 
(5.97) 
Age 0.55*** 
 
0.57*** 
 
(6.74) 
 
(7.12) 
MB 0.01 
 
-0.01 
 (0.15) (-0.16) 
    
Observations 6383 
 
6383 
Adjusted-R2 0.2097 
 
0.2363 
F-stat 121.98   142.07 
SAMB is a dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by central state assets management bureau. SOECG 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by other central ministries. LAMB is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if company controlled by local state assets management bureau. SOELG is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if company controlled by local government. OTHERS is set as base group because it have most companies in this 
group. Other variables remain in regression as control variables and definition of these variables same as 
previous. MB is market to book ratio.  
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcances at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 16 Pay-performance sensitivities in SOES and Non-SOEs (Accounting-based) 
        
Variables SOEs 
 
Non-SOEs 
        
Intercept -0.31 
 
-0.01 
 
(-0.58) 
 
(-0.02) 
∆ROA 0.28** 
 
0.01 
 
(2.24) 
 
(0.76) 
Size -0.08 
 
0.21 
 
(-0.07) 
 
(0.27) 
Concentration 0.03 
 
-0.02 
 
(0.23) 
 
(-0.15) 
Board -0.03 
 
-0.06 
 
(-0.38) 
 
(-0.99) 
IDD 0.32 
 
-0.39 
 
(1.05) 
 
(-1.58) 
SUP 0.06 
 
0.03 
 
(1.24) 
 
(0.76) 
IDDLOCAL 0.02 
 
0.02 
 
(1.22) 
 
(0.99) 
DUAL 0.06 
 
0.02 
 
(1.22) 
 
(0.67) 
Age 0.08 
 
0.08 
 
(0.68) 
 
(1.99) 
MB -0.05 
 
0.10 
 (-0.82)  (2.83) 
    
Observations 1709 
 
2888 
Adjusted-R2 0.0066 
 
0.0054 
F-stat 1.12   1.55 
∆CEOPAY (Dependent variable) is change in log of CEO compensation. ∆ROA is change in ROA. Size is 
log of company total annual sales. Concentration is sum of squares of proportionate shareholdings of 
the five largest shareholders in the company. Board is log of board size which measured by total 
numbers of directors on the board. IDD is proportion of independent directors on the board. SUP is 
log of total numbers of supervisors on board of supervisors. IDDLOCAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if working area of independent director and company’s headquarters are in same province. DUAL is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is also the chairman of the company. Age is log of CEO natural age. 
MB is market to book ratio.  
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcances at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 17 Pay-performance sensitivities in SOES and Non-SOEs (Market-based) 
        
Variables SOEs 
 
Non-SOEs 
        
Intercept -0.30 
 
0.02 
 
(-0.56) 
 
(0.04) 
∆EPS 0.12*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
(4.08) 
 
(3.92) 
Size 0.07 
 
0.20 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.26) 
Concentration 0.03 
 
-0.02 
 
(0.22) 
 
(-0.15) 
Board -0.04 
 
-0.08 
 
(-0.46) 
 
(-1.09) 
IDD 0.30 
 
-0.40 
 
(1.02) 
 
(-1.60) 
SUP 0.06 
 
0.03 
 
(1.33) 
 
(0.73) 
IDDLOCAL 0.02 
 
0.02 
 
(0.76) 
 
(0.88) 
DUAL 0.06 
 
0.03 
 
(1.12) 
 
(0.77) 
Age 0.08 
 
0.08 
 
(0.61) 
 
(0.97) 
MB -0.05 
 
0.09 
 (-0.85)  (2.78) 
    
Observations 1709 
 
2888 
Adjusted-R2 0.0075 
 
0.007 
F-stat 2.28   3.04 
∆CEOPAY (Dependent variable) is change in log of CEO compensation. ∆EPS is change in EPS. Size is 
log of company total annual sales. Concentration is sum of squares of proportionate shareholdings of 
the five largest shareholders in the company. Board is log of board size which measured by total 
numbers of directors on the board. IDD is proportion of independent directors on the board. SUP is 
log of total numbers of supervisors on board of supervisors. IDDLOCAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if working area of independent director and company’s headquarters are in same province. DUAL is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is also the chairman of the company. Age is log of CEO natural age. 
MB is market to book ratio.  
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcances at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 18 Pay-performance sensitivities under different ultimate controller types 
(Accounting-based) 
                    
Variables SAMB 
 
SOECG 
 
LAMB 
 
SOELG 
 
OTHERS 
                    
Intercept 0.36 
 
0.19 
 
-0.27 
 
-0.83 
 
-0.49 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(-0.45) 
 
(-0.71) 
 
(-1.03) 
∆ROA 0.94*** 
 
0.87 
 
0.27** 
 
0.27 
 
0.01 
 
(2.61) 
 
(1.24) 
 
(2.40) 
 
(1.28) 
 
(0.58) 
Size -0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
0.02* 
 
(-1.33) 
 
(-0.18) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(-0.57) 
 
(1.83) 
Concentration 0.13 
 
-0.45 
 
0.04 
 
-0.09 
 
0.12 
 
(0.60) 
 
(-1.19) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(-0.33) 
 
(0.89) 
Board -0.02 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.05 
 
0.20 
 
-0.06 
 
(-0.12) 
 
(-0.47) 
 
(-0.55) 
 
(1.13) 
 
(-0.79) 
IDD 0.01 
 
-0.06 
 
0.22 
 
0.68 
 
-0.48 
 
(0.00) 
 
(-0.05) 
 
(0.65) 
 
(1.01) 
 
(-1.56) 
SUP 0.05 
 
0.13 
 
0.07 
 
-0.01 
 
0.05 
 
(0.74) 
 
(0.89) 
 
(1.28) 
 
(-0.13) 
 
(0.84) 
IDDLOCAL 0.02 
 
0.04 
 
0.05 
 
-0.01 
 
0.01 
 
(0.51) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(1.51) 
 
(-0.09) 
 
(0.29) 
DUAL 0.06 
 
0.07 
 
0.04 
 
0.08 
 
0.03 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.75) 
 
(0.82) 
 
(0.68) 
Age 0.05 
 
0.04 
 
0.07 
 
0.17 
 
0.13 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.52) 
 
(0.63) 
 
(1.28) 
MB 0.19 
 
0.86 
 
0.05 
 
0.14 
 
0.11 
 (0.58)  (0.97)  (1.49)  (0.72)  (1.30) 
          
Observations 650 
 
197 
 
1480 
 
362 
 
1804 
Adjusted-R2 0.0012 
 
0.0333 
 
0.003 
 
0.0144 
 
0.0014 
F-stat 1.08   0.64   1.44   0.51   1.24 
∆CEOPAY (Dependent variable) is change in log of CEO compensation. ∆ROA is change in ROA. SAMB 
is company controlled by central state assets management bureau. SOECG is company controlled by 
other central ministries. LAMB is company controlled by local state assets management bureau. 
SOELG is company controlled by local government. OTHERS is company controlled by other forms. 
Size is log of company total annual sales. Concentration is sum of squares of proportionate 
shareholdings of the five largest shareholders in the company. Board is log of board size which 
measured by total numbers of directors on the board. IDD is proportion of independent directors on 
the board. SUP is log of total numbers of supervisors on board of supervisors. IDDLOCAL is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if working area of independent director and company’s headquarters are in same 
province. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is also the chairman of the company. Age is log 
of CEO natural age. MB is market to book ratio.  
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcances at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 19 Pay-performance sensitivities under different ultimate controller types 
(Market-based) 
                    
Variables SAMB 
 
SOECG 
 
LAMB 
 
SOELG 
 
OTHERS 
                    
Intercept 0.26 
 
0.10 
 
-0.22 
 
-0.84 
 
-0.46 
 
(0.30) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(-0.38) 
 
(-0.72) 
 
(-0.95) 
∆EPS 0.25*** 
 
0.11 
 
0.14*** 
 
0.13** 
 
0.03* 
 
(4.61) 
 
(0.80) 
 
(4.54) 
 
(2.22) 
 
(1.79) 
Size -0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
0.02 
 
(-1.22) 
 
(-0.25) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(-0.67) 
 
(1.81) 
Concentration 0.14 
 
-0.44 
 
0.04 
 
-0.09 
 
0.12 
 
(0.65) 
 
(-1.17) 
 
(0.33) 
 
(-0.34) 
 
(0.87) 
Board -0.03 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.06 
 
0.19 
 
-0.07 
 
(-0.25) 
 
(-0.49) 
 
(-0.64) 
 
(1.12) 
 
(-0.85) 
IDD -0.08 
 
0.08 
 
0.24 
 
0.73 
 
-0.50 
 
(-0.16) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.70) 
 
(1.09) 
 
(-1.60) 
SUP 0.05 
 
0.13 
 
0.07 
 
-0.01 
 
0.05 
 
(0.75) 
 
(0.91) 
 
(1.37) 
 
(-0.08) 
 
(0.85) 
IDDLOCAL 0.02 
 
0.05 
 
0.05 
 
-0.01 
 
0.01 
 
(0.40) 
 
(0.49) 
 
(1.44) 
 
(-0.01) 
 
(0.22) 
DUAL -0.01 
 
0.04 
 
0.04 
 
0.07 
 
0.03 
 
(-0.05) 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.68) 
 
(0.76) 
 
(0.75) 
Age 0.08 
 
0.07 
 
0.07 
 
0.17 
 
0.12 
 
(0.40) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.48) 
 
(0.67) 
 
(1.24) 
MB 0.11 
 
0.01 
 
0.05 
 
0.16 
 
0.11 
 (0.34)  (0.94)  (1.46)  (0.79)  (1.26) 
          
Observations 650 
 
197 
 
1480 
 
362 
 
1804 
Adjusted-R2 0.023 
 
0.0287 
 
0.0129 
 
0.0236 
 
0.0029 
F-stat 2.52   0.55   2.94   0.85   1.53 
∆CEOPAY (Dependent variable) is change in log of CEO compensation. ∆EPS is change in EPS. SAMB is 
company controlled by central state assets management bureau. SOECG is company controlled by 
other central ministries. LAMB is company controlled by local state assets management bureau. 
SOELG is company controlled by local government. OTHERS is company controlled by other forms. 
Size is log of company total annual sales. Concentration is sum of squares of proportionate 
shareholdings of the five largest shareholders in the company. Board is log of board size which 
measured by total numbers of directors on the board. IDD is proportion of independent directors on 
the board. SUP is log of total numbers of supervisors on board of supervisors. IDDLOCAL is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if working area of independent director and company’s headquarters are in same 
province. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is also the chairman of the company. Age is log 
of CEO natural age. MB is market to book ratio.  
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcances at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 20 Pay-performance sensitivities using lag value of performance variables 
        
Variables Accounting-based 
 
Market-based 
  Performance=ROA   performance=EPS 
Intercept -0.13 
 
-0.17 
 
(-0.44) 
 
(-0.55) 
ROA t-1 0.01 
  
 
(0.38) 
  EPS t-1 
  
-0.02 
   
(-1.21) 
Size 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.51) 
SOE 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.03) 
Concentration -0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
(-0.28) 
 
(-0.19) 
Board -0.05 
 
-0.05 
 
(-1.05) 
 
(-1.04) 
IDD -0.09 
 
-0.09 
 
(-0.49) 
 
(-0.48) 
SUP 0.05 
 
0.05 
 
(1.49) 
 
(1.46) 
IDDLOCAL 0.02 
 
0.02 
 
(1.11) 
 
(1.07) 
DUAL 0.03 
 
0.03 
 
(1.07) 
 
(1.04) 
Age 0.08 
 
0.08 
 
(1.19) 
 
(1.15) 
MB 0.06 
 
0.06 
 (2.14) (2.13) 
    
Observations 4605 
 
4605 
Adjusted-R2 0.0003 
 
0.0006 
F-stat 1.14   1.26 
∆CEOPAY (Dependent variable) is change in log of CEO compensation. ROAt-1 is lag value of return on 
assets which represent accounting based performance. EPS t-1 is lag value of earnings per share which 
represent market based performance. SOE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by 
state. Concentration is sum of squares of proportionate shareholdings of the five largest shareholders 
in the company. Board is log of board size which measured by total numbers of directors on the board. 
IDD is proportion of independent directors on the board. SUP is log of total numbers of supervisors on 
board of supervisors. IDDLOCAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if working area of independent 
director and company’s headquarters are in same province. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
CEO is also the chairman of the company. Age is log of CEO natural age. MB is market to book ratio.  
 
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcances at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 21 Robustness test 1a, size proxy replaced from sales to assets 
            
Variables Accounting-based 
 
Market-based 
 
Combined 
  Performance=ROA   performance=EPS   ROA and EPS 
Intercept 3.41*** 
 
3.88*** 
 
3.86*** 
 
(9.84) 
 
(11.35) 
 
(11.31) 
ROA 0.36*** 
   
0.17* 
 
(3.28) 
   
(1.65) 
EPS 
  
0.26*** 
 
0.25*** 
   
(16.21) 
 
(15.95) 
Size 0.32*** 
 
0.29*** 
 
0.29*** 
 
(37.18) 
 
(34.09) 
 
(34.11) 
SOE -0.11*** 
 
-0.10*** 
 
-0.10*** 
 
(-4.81) 
 
(-4.40) 
 
(-4.40) 
Concentration -0.66*** 
 
-0.76*** 
 
-0.76*** 
 
(-7.56) 
 
(-8.87) 
 
(-8.87) 
Board 0.27*** 
 
0.24*** 
 
0.24*** 
 
(4.70) 
 
(4.29) 
 
(4.28) 
IDD 0.73*** 
 
0.74*** 
 
0.73*** 
 
(3.33) 
 
(3.45) 
 
(3.38) 
SUP -0.18*** 
 
-0.17*** 
 
-0.17*** 
 
(-4.97) 
 
(-4.82) 
 
(-4.84) 
IDDLOCAL 0.08*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
(3.70) 
 
(3.63) 
 
(3.61) 
DUAL 0.21*** 
 
0.20*** 
 
0.20*** 
 
(6.67) 
 
(6.68) 
 
(6.71) 
Age 0.42*** 
 
0.46*** 
 
0.46*** 
 
(5.29) 
 
(5.84) 
 
(5.83) 
MB 0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 (0.05) (-0.27) (-0.25) 
      
Observations 6394 
 
6394 
 
6394 
Adjusted-R2 0.2234 
 
0.2528 
 
0.253 
F-stat 168.17   197.67   181.47 
CEOPAY (Dependent variable) is natural log of CEO total cash compensation. Two performance 
measures were used in regression. ROA is return on assets which represent accounting based 
performance. EPS is earnings per share which represent market based performance. Size is log of 
company total assets. SOE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by state. 
Concentration is sum of squares of proportionate shareholdings of the five largest shareholders in the 
company. Board is log of board size which measured by total numbers of directors on the board. IDD 
is proportion of independent directors on the board. SUP is log of total numbers of supervisors on 
board of supervisors. IDDLOCAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if working area of independent 
director and company’s headquarters are in same province. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
CEO is also the chairman of the company. Age is log of CEO natural age. MB is market to book ratio.  
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcances at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 22 Robustness test 1b, applied different performance measurements 
            
Variables Accounting-based 
 
Market-based 
 
Combined 
  Performance=ROE   performance=TSR   ROE and TSR 
Intercept 4.22*** 
 
4.15*** 
 
4.18*** 
 
(11.90) 
 
(11.59) 
 
(11.41) 
ROA 0.06*** 
   
0.06*** 
 
(6.22) 
   
(5.95) 
EPS 
  
0.02** 
 
0.02* 
   
(2.38) 
 
(1.87) 
Size 0.25*** 
 
0.25*** 
 
0.25*** 
 
(31.56) 
 
(33.36) 
 
(30.74) 
SOE -0.13*** 
 
-0.13*** 
 
-0.13*** 
 
(-5.91) 
 
(-5.82) 
 
(-5.64) 
Concentration -0.65*** 
 
-0.66*** 
 
-0.70*** 
 
(-7.39) 
 
(-7.32) 
 
(-7.66) 
Board 0.36*** 
 
0.35*** 
 
0.32*** 
 
(6.29) 
 
(6.05) 
 
(5.56) 
IDD 1.02*** 
 
1.15*** 
 
1.08*** 
 
(4.60) 
 
(5.00) 
 
(4.68) 
SUP -0.08** 
 
-0.09*** 
 
-0.08** 
 
(-2.23) 
 
(-2.53) 
 
(-2.16) 
IDDLOCAL 0.07*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
(3.37) 
 
(3.14) 
 
(3.22) 
DUAL 0.20*** 
 
0.17*** 
 
0.19*** 
 
(6.31) 
 
(5.22) 
 
(5.50) 
Age 0.55*** 
 
0.54*** 
 
0.56*** 
 
(6.75) 
 
(6.52) 
 
(6.67) 
MB 0.02 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.01 
 (0.57) (-0.97) (-0.03) 
      
Observations 6180 
 
6011 
 
5833 
Adjusted-R2 0.1896 
 
0.2017 
 
0.1891 
F-stat 132.46   139.08   114.32 
CEOPAY (Dependent variable) is natural log of CEO total cash compensation. Two performance 
measures were used in regression. ROE is return on equity which represents accounting based 
performance. TSR is annual total shareholder return which represents market based performance. 
Size is log of company total assets. SOE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by state. 
Concentration is sum of squares of proportionate shareholdings of the five largest shareholders in the 
company. Board is log of board size which measured by total numbers of directors on the board. IDD 
is proportion of independent directors on the board. SUP is log of total numbers of supervisors on 
board of supervisors. IDDLOCAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if working area of independent 
director and company’s headquarters are in same province. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
CEO is also the chairman of the company. Age is log of CEO natural age. MB is market to book ratio.  
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcances at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 23 Robustness test 2a, all data from 2005 to 2007 
            
Variables Accounting-based 
 
Market-based 
 
Combined 
  Performance=ROA   performance=EPS   ROA and EPS 
Intercept 3.47*** 
 
4.02*** 
 
4.02*** 
 
(7.67) 
 
(9.13) 
 
(9.13) 
ROA 0.20** 
   
0.02 
 
(1.94) 
   
(0.22) 
EPS 
  
0.38*** 
 
0.38*** 
   
(14.82) 
 
(14.68) 
Size 0.27*** 
 
0.23*** 
 
0.23*** 
 
(28.41) 
 
(23.75) 
 
(23.70) 
SOE -0.07*** 
 
-0.06** 
 
-0.06** 
 
(-2.54) 
 
(-2.11) 
 
(-2.11) 
Concentration -0.72*** 
 
-0.84*** 
 
-0.84*** 
 
(-6.34) 
 
(-7.56) 
 
(-7.56) 
Board 0.40*** 
 
0.40*** 
 
0.40*** 
 
(5.58) 
 
(5.72) 
 
(5.72) 
IDD 1.23*** 
 
1.16*** 
 
1.16*** 
 
(4.15) 
 
(4.02) 
 
(4.01) 
SUP -0.11*** 
 
-0.13*** 
 
-0.13*** 
 
(-2.50) 
 
(-2.86) 
 
(-2.86) 
IDDLOCAL 0.10*** 
 
0.09*** 
 
0.09*** 
 
(3.68) 
 
(3.52) 
 
(3.51) 
DUAL 0.16*** 
 
0.15*** 
 
0.15*** 
 
(3.83) 
 
(3.67) 
 
(3.67) 
Age 0.54*** 
 
0.62*** 
 
0.62*** 
 
(5.21) 
 
(6.08) 
 
(6.08) 
MB -0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 (-0.35) (-1.00) (-1.00) 
      
Observations 3594 
 
3594 
 
3594 
Adjusted-R2 0.2331 
 
0.2767 
 
0.2765 
F-stat 100.29   125.93   115.41 
CEOPAY (Dependent variable) is natural log of CEO total cash compensation. Two performance 
measures were used in regression. ROA is return on assets which represent accounting based 
performance. EPS is earnings per share which represent market based performance. Size is log of 
company total annual sales. SOE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by state. 
Concentration is sum of squares of proportionate shareholdings of the five largest shareholders in the 
company. Board is log of board size which measured by total numbers of directors on the board. IDD 
is proportion of independent directors on the board. SUP is log of total numbers of supervisors on 
board of supervisors. IDDLOCAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if working area of independent 
director and company’s headquarters are in same province. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
CEO is also the chairman of the company. Age is log of CEO natural age. MB is market to book ratio.  
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcances at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 24 Robustness test 2b, estimations with year dummies 
            
Variables Accounting-based 
 
Market-based 
 
Combined 
  Performance=ROA   performance=EPS   ROA and EPS 
Intercept 4.16*** 
 
4.55*** 
 
4.55*** 
 
(12.32) 
 
(13.63) 
 
(13.63) 
ROA 0.18* 
   
0.04 
 
(1.69) 
   
(0.35) 
EPS 
  
0.23*** 
 
0.22*** 
   
(14.15) 
 
(14.05) 
Size 0.23*** 
 
0.21*** 
 
0.21*** 
 
(32.35) 
 
(29.07) 
 
(29.05) 
SOE -0.09*** 
 
-0.08*** 
 
-0.08*** 
 
(-4.15) 
 
(-3.77) 
 
(-3.77) 
Concentration -0.49*** 
 
-0.58*** 
 
-0.58*** 
 
(-5.64) 
 
(-6.79) 
 
(-6.78) 
Board 0.43*** 
 
0.40*** 
 
0.40*** 
 
(7.74) 
 
(7.37) 
 
(7.38) 
IDD 0.67*** 
 
0.68*** 
 
0.68*** 
 
(3.09) 
 
(3.20) 
 
(3.19) 
SUP -0.09*** 
 
-0.09*** 
 
-0.09*** 
 
(-2.63) 
 
(-2.56) 
 
(-2.56) 
IDDLOCAL 0.07*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
(3.17) 
 
(3.27) 
 
(3.26) 
DUAL 0.17*** 
 
0.17*** 
 
0.17*** 
 
(5.58) 
 
(5.64) 
 
(5.65) 
Age 0.70*** 
 
0.72*** 
 
0.72*** 
 
(8.82) 
 
(9.17) 
 
(9.17) 
MB -0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 (-1.02) (-1.14) (-1.14) 
Year dummies +  +  + 
      
Observations 6383 
 
6383 
 
6383 
Adjusted-R2 0.2485 
 
0.271 
 
0.2709 
F-stat 141.66   159.2   149.24 
CEOPAY (Dependent variable) is natural log of CEO total cash compensation. Two performance 
measures were used in regression. ROA is return on assets which represent accounting based 
performance. EPS is earnings per share which represent market based performance. Size is log of 
company total annual sales. SOE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by state. 
Concentration is sum of squares of proportionate shareholdings of the five largest shareholders in the 
company. Board is log of board size which measured by total numbers of directors on the board. IDD 
is proportion of independent directors on the board. SUP is log of total numbers of supervisors on 
board of supervisors. IDDLOCAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if working area of independent 
director and company’s headquarters are in same province. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
CEO is also the chairman of the company. Age is log of CEO natural age. MB is market to book ratio. 
Year dummies are five dummy variables equal to 1 if companies in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 
respectively. 
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcances at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 25 Robustness test 3, main regressions with industry dummies 
            
Variables Accounting-based 
 
Market-based 
 
Combined 
  Performance=ROA   performance=EPS   ROA and EPS 
Intercept 4.67*** 
 
5.12*** 
 
5.13*** 
 
(13.53) 
 
(14.92) 
 
(14.91) 
ROA 0.16* 
   
0.08 
 
(12.07) 
   
(0.08) 
EPS 
  
0.24*** 
 
0.24*** 
   
(15.15) 
 
(15.07) 
Size 0.26*** 
 
0.24*** 
 
0.24*** 
 
(31.07) 
 
(32.05) 
 
(32.02) 
SOE -0.13*** 
 
-0.11*** 
 
-0.11*** 
 
(-5.90) 
 
(-5.35) 
 
(-5.35) 
Concentration -0.62*** 
 
-0.69*** 
 
-0.69*** 
 
(-6.74) 
 
(-7.96) 
 
(-7.96) 
Board 0.27*** 
 
0.25*** 
 
0.25*** 
 
(4.82) 
 
(4.54) 
 
(4.54) 
IDD 1.00*** 
 
0.98*** 
 
0.98*** 
 
(4.72) 
 
(4.66) 
 
(4.65) 
SUP -0.11*** 
 
-0.10*** 
 
-0.10*** 
 
(-3.08) 
 
(-2.92) 
 
(-2.92) 
IDDLOCAL 0.06*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.06** 
 
(2.84) 
 
(2.70) 
 
(2.70) 
DUAL 0.20*** 
 
0.19*** 
 
0.19*** 
 
(6.15) 
 
(6.43) 
 
(6.43) 
Age 0.46*** 
 
0.49*** 
 
0.49*** 
 
(5.89) 
 
(6.28) 
 
(6.28) 
MB -0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 (-0.12) (-0.30) (-0.30) 
Industry +  +  + 
      
Observations 6383 
 
6383 
 
6383 
Adjusted-R2 0.2546 
 
0.2777 
 
0.2776 
F-stat 84.56   107.66   103.16 
CEOPAY (Dependent variable) is natural log of CEO total cash compensation. Two performance 
measures were used in regression. ROA is return on assets which represent accounting based 
performance. EPS is earnings per share which represent market based performance. Size is log of 
company total annual sales. SOE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by state. 
Concentration is sum of squares of proportionate shareholdings of the five largest shareholders in the 
company. Board is log of board size which measured by total numbers of directors on the board. IDD 
is proportion of independent directors on the board. SUP is log of total numbers of supervisors on 
board of supervisors. IDDLOCAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if working area of independent 
director and company’s headquarters are in same province. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
CEO is also the chairman of the company. Age is log of CEO natural age. MB is market to book ratio. 
Industry is thirteen dummies equal to 1 if companies in certain category according to CSRC. 
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcances at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 26 Robustness test 4a, main regressions with control of area (by 
consumption level) 
            
Variables Accounting-based 
 
Market-based 
 
Combined 
  Performance=ROA   performance=EPS   ROA and EPS 
Intercept 4.42*** 
 
4.82*** 
 
4.82*** 
 
(13.16) 
 
(14.54) 
 
(14.54) 
ROA 0.21** 
   
0.06 
 
(1.98) 
   
(0.55) 
EPS 
  
0.23*** 
 
0.23*** 
   
(14.71) 
 
(14.59) 
Size 0.23*** 
 
0.21*** 
 
0.21*** 
 
(32.92) 
 
(29.38) 
 
(29.37) 
SOE -0.07*** 
 
-0.06*** 
 
-0.06*** 
 
(-3.29) 
 
(-2.86) 
 
(-2.86) 
Concentration -0.66*** 
 
-0.74*** 
 
-0.74*** 
 
(-7.72) 
 
(-8.76) 
 
(-8.76) 
Board 0.36*** 
 
0.34*** 
 
0.34*** 
 
(6.64) 
 
(6.28) 
 
(6.28) 
IDD 1.04*** 
 
1.03*** 
 
1.03*** 
 
(4.89) 
 
(4.92) 
 
(4.89) 
SUP -0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
(-0.62) 
 
(-0.57) 
 
(-0.57) 
IDDLOCAL 0.04* 
 
0.03* 
 
0.03* 
 
(1.74) 
 
(1.70) 
 
(1.69) 
DUAL 0.16*** 
 
0.16*** 
 
0.16*** 
 
(5.38) 
 
(5.40) 
 
(5.41) 
Age 0.48*** 
 
0.51*** 
 
0.51*** 
 
(6.13) 
 
(6.60) 
 
(6.60) 
MB 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.02 
 (0.32) (0.04) (0.04) 
Area +  +  + 
      
Observations 6383 
 
6383 
 
6383 
Adjusted-R2 0.2578 
 
0.2817 
 
0.2817 
F-stat 185.72   209.62   193.5 
CEOPAY (Dependent variable) is natural log of CEO total cash compensation. Two performance 
measures were used in regression. ROA is return on assets which represent accounting based 
performance. EPS is earnings per share which represent market based performance. Size is log of 
company total annual sales. SOE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by state. 
Concentration is sum of squares of proportionate shareholdings of the five largest shareholders in the 
company. Board is log of board size which measured by total numbers of directors on the board. IDD 
is proportion of independent directors on the board. SUP is log of total numbers of supervisors on 
board of supervisors. IDDLOCAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if working area of independent 
director and company’s headquarters are in same province. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
CEO is also the chairman of the company. Age is log of CEO natural age. MB is market to book ratio. 
Area is a dummy variable equal to 1 if companies in more developed province and equal to 0 if 
companies in less developed province. 
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcances at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 27 Robustness test 4b, main regressions with control of area (by GDP) 
            
Variables Accounting-based 
 
Market-based 
 
Combined 
  Performance=ROA   performance=EPS   ROA and EPS 
Intercept 4.11*** 
 
4.53*** 
 
4.52*** 
 
(12.00) 
 
(13.40) 
 
(13.39) 
ROA 0.21** 
   
0.05 
 
(1.93) 
   
(0.50) 
EPS 
  
0.24*** 
 
0.24*** 
   
(14.81) 
 
(14.69) 
Size 0.24*** 
 
0.22*** 
 
0.22*** 
 
(33.70) 
 
(30.09) 
 
(30.07) 
SOE -0.09*** 
 
-0.08*** 
 
-0.08*** 
 
(-4.05) 
 
(-3.63) 
 
(-3.63) 
Concentration -0.64*** 
 
-0.72*** 
 
-0.72*** 
 
(-7.31) 
 
(-8.36) 
 
(-8.36) 
Board 0.39*** 
 
0.36*** 
 
0.36*** 
 
(6.98) 
 
(6.61) 
 
(6.61) 
IDD 1.13*** 
 
1.12*** 
 
1.11*** 
 
(5.20) 
 
(5.22) 
 
(5.20) 
SUP -0.06* 
 
-0.06* 
 
-0.06* 
 
(-1.83) 
 
(-1.77) 
 
(-1.78) 
IDDLOCAL 0.06*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
(2.67) 
 
(2.61) 
 
(2.61) 
DUAL 0.18*** 
 
0.18*** 
 
0.18*** 
 
(5.76) 
 
(5.78) 
 
(5.79) 
Age 0.51*** 
 
0.53*** 
 
0.53*** 
 
(6.35) 
 
(6.82) 
 
(6.81) 
MB 0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 (0.15) (-0.14) (-0.13) 
Area +  +  + 
      
Observations 6383 
 
6383 
 
6383 
Adjusted-R2 0.2278 
 
0.253 
 
0.2529 
F-stat 157.86   181.16   167.22 
CEOPAY (Dependent variable) is natural log of CEO total cash compensation. Two performance 
measures were used in regression. ROA is return on assets which represent accounting based 
performance. EPS is earnings per share which represent market based performance. Size is log of 
company total annual sales. SOE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if company controlled by state. 
Concentration is sum of squares of proportionate shareholdings of the five largest shareholders in the 
company. Board is log of board size which measured by total numbers of directors on the board. IDD 
is proportion of independent directors on the board. SUP is log of total numbers of supervisors on 
board of supervisors. IDDLOCAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if working area of independent 
director and company’s headquarters are in same province. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
CEO is also the chairman of the company. Age is log of CEO natural age. MB is market to book ratio. 
Area is a dummy variable equal to 1 if companies in more developed province and equal to 0 if 
companies in less developed province. 
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcances at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
